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Bradford R. Clark *  
 
Introduction 
The Supreme Court recently resolved a longstanding disagreement 
among the Justices regarding the proper degree of judicial discretion 
under the Eighth Amendment.  Five Justices construed the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause to grant judges broad latitude to invalidate 
punishments they consider—in the exercise of their own independent 
judgment—to contradict society’s evolving standards of decency.1  The 
remaining Justices read the clause more narrowly to allow judges to 
invalidate punishments only when there is objective evidence of a 
societal consensus against them.  Although the Court’s ruling represents 
an important Eighth Amendment precedent, its resolution of the 
underlying methodological issue raises a more fundamental question 
about the proper scope of judicial discretion under the constitutional 
structure—a question as old as the Constitution itself.  Historically, 
proponents of broad judicial discretion have invoked specific 
constitutional provisions in favor of such discretion, while opponents 
have invoked the constitutional structure against such discretion.  In 
several important historical examples, the Court first embraced broad 
policymaking discretion and then abandoned such discretion in the wake 
of sustained criticism that the judiciary had exceeded its constitutional 
role.  Several key features of the constitutional structure—as reflected in 
these historical examples—likewise suggest that the Eighth Amendment 
should not be read to assign broad policymaking discretion to courts. 
The issue arose after a plurality of the Court announced in Trop v. 
Dulles2 that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”3  In recent years, members of the Court have embraced two 
competing approaches for identifying such evolving standards.  
Thompson v. Oklahoma4 and Atkins v. Virginia,5 on the one hand, 
suggest that the Eighth Amendment embodies a broad delegation to the 
 
 * Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  I thank Rachel 
Barkow, A.J. Bellia, Curtis Bradley, Jack Goldsmith, Philip Hamburger, Bill Kelley, 
John Manning, John McGinnis, Jon Molot, Henry Monaghan, Caleb Nelson, Adrian 
Vermeule, Art Wilmarth, John Yoo, Ernie Young, and my colleagues at GW for helpful 
comments and suggestions.   
1 See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S.Ct. 1183 (2005).   
2 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
3 Id. at 101 (plurality opinion). 
4 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
5 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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Court to exercise its own independent judgment about the moral and 
penological propriety of capital punishment in various circumstances.  
Stanford v. Kentucky,6 on the other hand, suggests that the Court must 
examine objective indicia to ascertain whether, in fact, a punishment has 
become “unusual” in the sense that a large proportion of states have 
rejected its particular application.  Last Term, in Roper v. Simmons,7 the 
Court broke the impasse by overruling Stanford and embracing “the idea 
that this Court is required to bring its independent judgment to bear on 
the proportionality of the death penalty for a particular class of crimes or 
offenders.”8 
The Supreme Court did not attempt to tie its embrace of broad 
judicial discretion to the original understanding or even a close historical 
analysis of the Eighth Amendment.  This is not surprising in that 
questions about the proper scope of judicial discretion are not limited to 
the Eighth Amendment context and are hardly novel.  During the 
ratification debates, for example, Antifederalists charged that Article III 
would allow federal courts “to explain the constitution according to the 
reasoning spirit of it, without being confined to the words or letter.”9  
Federalists countered with assurances that the judiciary would be the 
“least dangerous” branch10 because the Constitution would prevent “an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts”11 by confining them to the exercise of 
“judgment” rather than “will.”12  The Constitution was ratified based in 
part on these assurances. 
The current debate among the Justices over the scope of discretion 
under the Eighth Amendment goes to the heart of our constitutional 
structure.  By failing to tie its approach to the original understanding of 
the Eighth Amendment, the Court has in effect adopted a conception of 
the judicial power that allows judges to act as independent moral agents 
rather than as mere conduits of society’s value judgments.  The question 
the Court must ask, therefore, is whether its approach is consistent with 
our understanding of the constitutional structure.  Two historical 
examples may shed light on the question.  In both instances, federal 
courts first embraced broad judicial discretion and then abandoned it as 
inconsistent with the constitutional structure.  
First, early in the nation’s history, the judiciary took it upon itself to 
recognize and enforce federal common law crimes.  Federalists generally 
defended the practice as an inherent part of “the judicial Power of the 
 
6 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
7 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
8 Id. at 1198.  
9 Essay XI of Brutus, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 419 (Herbert 
Storing ed., 1981). 
10 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
11 Id. at 471. 
12 Id. at 465. 
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United States,”13 while Jeffersonian Republicans charged that the 
doctrine “would confer on the judicial department a discretion little short 
of a legislative power.”14  Although almost all members of the Supreme 
Court initially embraced federal common law crimes, the Court 
ultimately rejected the practice as contrary to the constitutional system of 
checks and balances.15 
Second, in Swift v. Tyson,16 the Supreme Court claimed authority 
under Article III to displace state law in favor of so-called general law—
that is, law found independently by the Court in light of the general 
practice of American and foreign courts.17  After applying and expanding 
the Swift doctrine for almost a century, the Court ultimately held in Erie 
R. Co. v. Tompkins18 that the doctrine amounted to “an unconstitutional 
assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States.”19  According 
to Erie, various aspects of the constitutional structure prevent federal 
courts from making law on behalf of the United States, and thus render 
Swift’s interpretation of Article III inadmissible.20 
These historical instances of judicial discretion and retreat reveal 
several interlocking features of the constitutional structure designed to 
check federal power and preserve the governance prerogatives of the 
states.  The Supremacy Clause recognizes only three sources of law—the 
“Constitution,” “Laws,” and “Treaties” of the United States—as “the 
supreme Law of the Land.”21  The Constitution, in turn, prescribes 
precise procedures to govern the adoption of each source of supreme 
federal law.  These procedures ensure the operation of the “political 
safeguards of federalism”22 by requiring that the states or their 
representatives in the Senate approve each and every source of law 
capable of displacing state law.23  Federal lawmaking procedures also 
preserve the governance prerogatives of the states by requiring multiple 
federal actors subject to the political safeguards of federalism to adopt all 
 
13 U.S. Const. art. III.  See Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1106-07 (C.C.D. Pa. 
1793) (No. 6360) (reporting Justice James Wilson’s charge to a federal grand jury that 
“the common law” had been “received in America,” that “the law of nations” “in its 
fullest extent has been adopted by her,” and that “infractions of that law form a part of 
her code of criminal jurisprudence”).  
14 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 7, 1800), reprinted in 6 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 380 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
15 See  United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). 
16 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
17 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18-19. 
18 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
19 Id. at 79 (internal quotations omitted). 
20 Id. at 78. 
21 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
22 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
543 (1954) [hereinafter Wechsler, Political Safeguards]. 
23 See Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEXAS 
L. REV. 1321 (2001).  
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forms of “the supreme Law of the Land.”  Taken together, these features 
of the constitutional structure suggest that substantial policymaking 
discretion should be confined to the actors specified by federal 
lawmaking procedures. 
In light of these specific safeguards, the Supreme Court should 
hesitate before construing open-ended provisions of the Constitution to 
authorize judicial lawmaking unchecked by such safeguards.  By design, 
the Constitution makes federal law capable of preempting state law 
difficult to adopt.  Bicameralism and presentment, for example, gives 
states a voice in the lawmaking process and prevents the vast majority of 
federal proposals from ever becoming law.  Construing ambiguous 
constitutional provisions like the Eighth Amendment to give a single 
branch independent policymaking discretion to displace state law would 
circumvent both the letter and spirit of the carefully crafted safeguards 
built into the constitutional scheme. 
This paper contains four Parts.  Part I describes the longstanding 
split on the Supreme Court as to whether the Eighth Amendment 
essentially delegates policymaking discretion to judges to decide for 
themselves whether a particular punishment offends evolving standards 
of decency.  Part II examines the constitutional structure and the 
ratification debates regarding the proper scope of judicial discretion 
under the Constitution.  Part III reviews two prior cycles of judicial 
discretion in which federal courts first claimed and then renounced broad 
policymaking power in the name of the Constitution.  Finally, Part IV 
evaluates the reemergence of judicial discretion in the name of the Eighth 
Amendment, and concludes that both the text and structure of the 
Constitution counsel against construing the Amendment to give federal 
courts broad policymaking discretion. 
I. Judicial Discretion and the Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment provides that “cruel and unusual 
punishments” shall not be inflicted.24  The modern Supreme Court has 
long been divided over the proper approach to understanding this open-
textured language.  The Court has not purported to rely on the original 
understanding of the Eighth Amendment25 and my analysis does not 
attempt to revisit that choice.  There are several threshold questions in 
applying the clause.  First, does it apply only prohibit certain 
punishments per se or does it also ban particular applications of 
otherwise permissible punishments?  In other words, can a generally 
permissible punishment (i.e., the death penalty) be considered “cruel and 
unusual” as applied to a particular type of offender (i.e., a minor) or to a 
 
24 U.S. Const. Amend. XIII. 
25 See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The 
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 842 (1969) (reviewing evidence from the 
founding and suggesting that “the cruel and unusual punishments clause was directed at 
prohibiting certain methods of punishment” per se). 
 
5 Judicial Discretion  
 
particular type of crime (i.e., rape)?  Second, is the prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishments static or dynamic?  In other words, can a court 
invalidate punishments today that were permissible in 1791?26  In 
resolving these questions, the Court has embraced a broad interpretation 
of the clause.  In a series of cases, the Court has held that an otherwise 
permissible punishment may become “cruel and unusual” when applied 
to a certain class of offenses27 or offenders.28 
Beyond these threshold issues, the Court must decide how to 
determine whether the application of a particular punishment is “cruel 
and unusual.”  The Court’s modern framework originated in Trop v. 
Dulles,29 a case challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute 
providing for forfeiture of citizenship upon conviction of wartime 
desertion.  The Court invalidated the statute, but there was no majority 
opinion.30  The plurality announced that the Eighth Amendment “must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”31  Although Trop cautioned that the task 
of interpreting the Constitution “requires the exercise of judgment, not 
the reliance upon personal preferences,”32 the plurality gave little 
guidance on how courts should identify society’s “evolving standards of 
decency.” 
Members of the Court have embraced two competing approaches 
for identifying such standards.  Thompson v. Oklahoma33 represents the 
 
26 In construing the Seventh Amendment’s right to trial by jury, for example, the 
Court traditionally asks whether the litigants would have been entitled to jury in 1791.  
See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers Local 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990); 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). 
27 See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (invalidating the imposition of the death 
penalty for rape); Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (invalidating the imposition of 
the death penalty for felony murder); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (invalidating 
the imposition of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for a recidivist 
offender); but see Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (upholding imposition of life 
imprisonment for a recidivist offender); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (upholding 
imposition of a 40-year prison term for possession and distribution of nine ounces of 
marijuana); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (upholding imposition of life 
imprisonment without possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of 
cocaine); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding imposition of a prison term 
of twenty-five years to life for shoplifting by a repeat offender).  
28 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (invalidating execution of 
offenders under 16); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (invalidating execution of 
mentally retarded offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (invalidating 
execution of offenders under 18); but see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) 
(upholding execution of mentally retarded offenders); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 
361 (1989) (upholding execution of offenders under 18). 
29 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
30 A plurality held the statute to violate the Eighth Amendment, see Trop, 356 U.S. at 
87 (plurality opinion), while Justice Brennan concurred specially on the ground that the 
statute “is beyond the power of Congress to enact.”  Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring).  
31 Id. at 101 (plurality opinion). 
32 Id. at 103 (plurality opinion). 
33 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
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independent judgment or judicial delegation model.  There, the Court set 
aside a death sentence imposed on a defendant who committed first-
degree murder when he was 15 years old.  As in Trop, there was no 
majority opinion.  The plurality opinion first looked to “contemporary 
standards of decency as reflected by legislative enactments and jury 
sentences,”34 and concluded that it would offend such standards “to 
execute a person who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her 
offense.”35  Although acknowledging that “‘the judgments of 
legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance,’”36 the 
Thompson plurality insisted that “‘it is for us ultimately to judge whether 
the Eighth Amendment permits imposition of the death penalty’” on a 15 
year old offender.37  In other words, the Thompson plurality believed that 
the “authors of the Eighth Amendment” “delegated” the task of defining 
the contours of cruel and unusual punishments “to future generations of 
judges.”38  Thus, the plurality proceeded to decide, in the exercise of its 
own independent judgment, “that such a young person is not capable of 
acting with the degree of culpability that can justify the ultimate 
penalty.”39   
Stanford v. Kentucky,40 by contrast, represents the objective 
consensus model.  There, a majority of the Court upheld the imposition 
of capital punishment for individuals who were 16 and 17 years old at 
 
34 Id. at 823 n.7 (plurality opinion). 
35 Id. at 830 (plurality opinion).  The plurality noted that in 19 states, capital 
punishment is authorized but no minimum age is specified.  Id. at 826-27.  Thus, the 
plurality confined its “attention to the 18 States that have expressly established a 
minimum age in their death-penalty statutes.”  Id. at 829.  Because “all of them require 
that the defendant have attained at least the age of 16 at the time of the capital offense,” 
id., the plurality concluded that the objective indicators of contemporary standards 
disfavored the death penalty for offenders under the age of 16.  Justice O’Connor 
concurred only in the judgment and was reluctant to find a national consensus on the 
issue “without better evidence than we now possess.”  Id. at 849 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment).  Instead, she concluded “that the sentence in this case can 
and should be set aside on narrower grounds than those adopted by the plurality.”  Id.  
Because Oklahoma set no minimum age for the death penalty, there is a “considerable 
risk” that the legislature “did not give the question . . . serious consideration.”  Id. at 857 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).  Accordingly, Justice O’Connor concluded 
that defendants “below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not be executed 
under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum age.”  Id. at 
857-58 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
36 Id. at 833 (quoting Edmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982)). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 822.  See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (invalidating the 
death penalty for the mentally retarded based both on a national consensus against the 
practice and on the Court’s “independent evaluation of the issue”). 
39 Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823 (plurality opinion).  Strictly speaking, the plurality’s 
second step was unnecessary because it merely confirmed what the objective indicators 
already revealed about contemporary standards of decency.  Nonetheless, there is little 
doubt that the plurality viewed its independent judgment as the ultimate touchstone of 
constitutionality. 
40 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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the time of their offenses.  The Court explained that in “determining 
what standards have ‘evolved,’ . . . we have looked not to our own 
conceptions of decency, but to those of modern American society as a 
whole.”41  Accordingly, the Court upheld the sentences at issue based on 
“objective indicia” such as “statutes passed by society’s elected 
representatives.”42  A plurality of the Court went even further by 
rejecting the “argument that we should invalidate capital punishment of 
16- and 17-year-old offenders on the ground that it fails to serve the 
legitimate goals of penology.”43  The Stanford plurality also “decline[d] 
the invitation to rest constitutional law upon such uncertain foundations” 
as “public opinion polls, the views of interest groups, and the positions 
adopted by various professional associations.”44 
Last Term, in Roper v. Simmons,45 the Supreme Court overruled 
Stanford and strongly endorsed the independent judgment model.  
Significantly, in choosing between these competing approaches, the 
Court did not purport to ground its interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment either in its text or in the specific understanding of the text 
at the time of its adoption or, indeed, at any subsequent point prior to 
Trop.  I take the Court’s underlying framework as my starting point and 
seek here to examine the consistency of the competing approaches with 
broader implications of the constitutional structure. 
The immediate question before the Court in Roper was the 
constitutionality of Missouri’s death penalty as applied to a seventeen 
year old who committed capital murder.  Although the Court considered 
the practice of other states and foreign nations, it ultimately relied on its 
own independent assessment of the morality and effectiveness of the 
juvenile death penalty in a maturing society to invalidate the defendant’s 
sentence.  Initially, the Court examined the “objective indicia of 
consensus, as expressed . . . by the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question.”46  When the Court upheld the juvenile death 
penalty in Stanford, twenty-five states permitted such punishment.  
Roper emphasized that since Stanford was decided, “[f]ive states that 
allowed the juvenile death penalty . . . have abandoned it in the 
intervening fifteen years—four through legislative enactments and one 
through judicial decision”47—and none has changed its law to authorize 
 
41 Id. at 369. 
42 Id. at 370.   
43 Id. at 377.   
44 Id.  These Justices also rejected the “argument that we should invalidate capital 
punishment of 16- and 17-year-old offenders on the ground that it fails to serve the 
legitimate goals of penology.”  Id.  Justice O’Connor, who joined most of the Court’s 
opinion, declined to join the plurality on these points because she believed that the Court 
has “a constitutional obligation to conduct proportionality analysis.”  Id. at 382 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
45 125 S. Ct. at 1198. 
46 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192.  
47 Id. at 1193. 
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it.  Even with this shift, however, a majority of death penalty states (20 
out of 38)48 and a substantial minority of all states (20 out of 50) 
continued to authorize the practice.49 
If Roper rested solely on such “objective indicia,” then action by 
relatively few states would suffice to shift the balance back in favor of 
constitutionality.  Even one state could alter the “consistent direction of 
the change,” and a handful of states could shift the balance back to the 
levels upheld in Stanford and endorsed in Atkins.  Perhaps for this 
reason, the Roper Court did not rest its decision solely on the purported 
national consensus against the juvenile death penalty.  Rather, the Court 
characterized its “review of the objective indicia of consensus” as merely 
a “beginning point” that “gives us essential instruction.”50  Roper went 
on to explain that the Justices must ultimately “determine, in the exercise 
of our own independent judgment, whether the death penalty is a 
disproportionate punishment for juveniles.”51 
Turning to this task, the Roper Court took it upon itself to evaluate 
the sufficiency of “the penological justifications for the [juvenile] death 
penalty.”52  The Court began by concluding that from “a moral 
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with 
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character 
deficiencies will be reformed.”53  In the Court’s view, “the diminished 
 
48 Of course, by counting the 12 non-death penalty states, the Roper majority could 
observe that a “majority of States have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on 
juvenile offenders under 18.”  Id. at 1194.  The dissent objected to “the Court’s new 
method of counting.”  Id. at 1219 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see id. (“None of our cases 
dealing with an alleged constitutional limitation upon the death penalty has counted, as 
States supporting a consensus in favor of that limitation, States that have eliminated the 
death penalty entirely.”).   
49 Id. at 1200-01 (App. A).  Roper acknowledged that the states had been slower to 
abolish the death penalty for juveniles than the death penalty for the mentally retarded, 
but suggested that any difference in the pace of abolition is “counterbalanced by the 
consistent direction of the change.”  Id. at 1193.  Here, the Court was attempting to rely 
on Atkins, in which the Court found a national consensus against the death penalty for the 
mentally retarded based in part on “the consistency of the direction of change.”  536 U.S. 
304 (2002).  Roper’s reliance on Atkins, however, is arguably misplaced.  Between 1989 
and 2002, sixteen states abolished the death penalty for the mentally retarded.  The 
Atkins Court itself found comparison to the (then-permissible) juvenile death penalty 
“telling” because, during the same period, “only two state legislatures have raised the 
threshold age for imposition of the death penalty.”  Id. at 316 n.18.  In addition, Atkins 
acknowledged that proportionality review under evolving standards of decency “should 
be informed by objective factors to the maximum extent possible,” id. at 311 (internal 
quotations omitted), and that “the ‘clearest and most reliable objective evidence of 
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.’”  Id. 
(quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989)). 
50 Id. at 1192. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1196. 
53 Id. at 1195-96.  The Court gave three grounds for its moral judgment.  First, 
juveniles are more likely than adults to have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped 
sense of responsibility.”  Id. at 1195 (internal quotations omitted).  Second, “juveniles are 
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culpability of juveniles” means that “the penological justifications for the 
death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”54 
The Court next identified the “two distinct social purposes served 
by the death penalty” as retribution and deterrence.55  The Court opined 
that “the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an 
adult,” whether “viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the 
victim.”56  With respect to deterrence, the Court thought it “unclear 
whether the death penalty has a significant or even measurable deterrent 
effect on juveniles”57 because “the same characteristics that render 
juveniles less culpable than adults suggest as well that juveniles will be 
less susceptible to deterrence.”58  In fact, the Court went so far as to 
suggest that the “‘likelihood that the teenage offender has made the kind 
of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of 
execution is so remote as to be virtually nonexistent.’”59   
Whatever the merits of the Court’s substantive judgments about 
retribution, deterrence, and moral culpability, the important point for 
present purposes is that the Court was willing to determine the 
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty based on criteria unrelated 
to the existence of a national consensus against such punishment.  
Indeed, the Court expressly claimed that was free to depart from the 
“objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the 
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”60  In effect, 
Roper interpreted the Eighth Amendment to delegate broad discretion to 
the Court to exercise its own independent judgment about the moral and 
penological propriety of the challenged punishment.61  Accordingly, in 
the end, Roper rests on little more than the opinion of five Justices that 
“neither retribution nor deterrence provides adequate justification for 
imposing the death penalty on juvenile offenders.”62 
 
more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures” than adults.  
Id.  Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an adult.”  Id.  
54 Id. at 1196. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 837).  This conclusion is curious in 
light of the Court’s earlier observation that the defendant in Roper had in fact “assured 
his friends they could ‘get away with it’ because they were minors.”  Id. at 1187. 
60 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1192. 
61  
62 Id. at 1196.  Interestingly, the most widely noted aspect of the Roper opinion seems 
to be its invocation of “the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the 
juvenile death penalty.”  Id. at 1200.  See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, 
2004 Term—Comment: Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, 
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Jeremy Waldron, The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term—Comment: Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV. 129 
(2005); Ernest A. Young, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Comment: Foreign Law and 
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So understood, Roper suggests that the Court would not overrule its 
decision even if all five states that abandoned the juvenile death penalty 
between 1989 and 2005 now reinstated it.  Rather, in order to uphold the 
juvenile death penalty, a future majority of the Supreme Court would 
have to conclude—in the exercise of their own independent judgment—
that the juvenile death penalty is consistent with their conceptions of 
moral culpability, retribution, deterrence, and the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.63 
The propriety of attributing a regime of independent judicial 
judgment to an ambiguous constitutional text, of course, is not unique to 
the Eighth Amendment.  Indeed, that question has arisen in various 
aspects of our constitutional tradition.  Ultimately, the question under 
consideration involves nothing less than whether the phrase “cruel and 
unusual punishments” should be understood, without specific historical 
warrant, to delegate to the judiciary the authority to render independent 
penological judgments capable of displacing the contrary penological 
judgments of the state legislatures.  The constitutional structure bears on 
this question because it supplies intricate and precise procedures for 
adopting federal law capable of displacing state law.  Each type of law 
that results from those procedures—constitutional amendments, laws, 
and treaties—is expressly referenced in the Supremacy Clause.  
Moreover, all of the relevant procedures share the common feature of 
providing express protections for the states through the inclusion of the 
Senate in the lawmaking process. 
II. The Structural Presumption Against Judicial Discretion 
Some degree of discretion, of course, is inherent the judicial 
function.64  It is not unthinkable, moreover, that a Constitution would 
confer virtually unlimited judicial discretion over certain matters.  The 
 
the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148 (2005); John O. McGinnis, Foreign to 
Our Constitution, 100 NW.  U. L. REV. ___ (2005) (forthcoming).  The Court observed that 
“Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child . . . contains an 
express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles under 18,” 
Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1199, and that “the United States is the only country in the world 
that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty.”  Id. at 1198.  
Although Roper acknowledged that in the end such opinion does not control “our 
outcome,” id. at 2000, the Court observed that the “opinion of the world community” 
“provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”  Id. 
63 Given the Court’s approach, stare decisis seems to have little or no bearing on the 
Court’s willingness to shift ground.  Atkins overruled Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 
(1989), and Roper overruled Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), without any 
serious consideration of the doctrine.  Presumably, this stems from the dynamic nature of 
the test employed by the Court, which allows—or requires—the Court to reassess 
whether a given penalty offends the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society every time the question is brought before it. 
64 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“Error! Main 
Document Only.‘[A] certain degree of discretion, and thus of lawmaking, inheres in 
most executive or judicial action.’”) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
417 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting)). 
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question, however, is whether it is proper to attribute independent 
judicial discretion to open-ended constitutional provisions in the absence 
of a specific historical showing that those who drafted and ratified the 
provisions in fact understood them to confer such discretion.  This 
question is especially salient with respect to a constitutional structure like 
ours, which takes pains to channel federal discretion to displace state law 
through complicated procedures designed to safeguard federalism.  
Therefore, the question raised by the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence is this:  When the Court employs a framework 
that does not rely on the original understanding of the particular clause, 
what is the appropriate default position for understanding how to 
determine evolving standards of decency?  This inquiry is informed by 
similar debates over the appropriate role of judicial discretion under our 
constitutional structure more generally.65 
The debate over the permissible scope of judicial discretion under 
the Constitution began at the Founding.  The Founders carefully crafted 
the constitutional structure to incorporate a series of checks and balances 
that constrain policymaking discretion by federal officials.  These 
features of the constitutional structure suggest that the Constitution 
should not be interpreted to give federal courts unchecked policymaking 
discretion in the absence of a clear delegation by a specific provision of 
the constitutional text.  Consistent with the constitutional structure, 
Federalists specifically assured anxious citizens during the ratification 
debates that federal courts would be the least dangerous branch because 
they would “have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”66  
Thus, both the Constitution’s structure and its history counsel against 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment to confer substantial policymaking 
discretion on federal courts. 
A. Structure 
The Constitution is carefully structured to restrict both who may 
exercise lawmaking power on behalf of the United States and how they 
may exercise it.  Specifically, the Constitution prescribes precise 
procedures to govern the adoption of all forms of “the supreme Law of 
the Land”—i.e., the “Constitution,” “Laws,” and “Treaties” of the United 
States.67  Although different in crucial respects, all of these procedures 
assign responsibility for adopting “the supreme Law of the Land” solely 
 
65 Here, I am suggesting a form of intratextualism or, more precisely, 
intrastructuralism.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) 
(urging interpreters to read a word or phrase in a particular clause in light of identical or 
similar words or phrases found elsewhere in the Constitution); see also Akhil Reed 
Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L. J. 671, 672 (2002) (urging interpreters to “notice key 
features of the document—its size and shape, its style and layout, its exterior facades and 
interior motifs—whose significance is lost on most lawyers and judges today”). 
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
67 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
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to actors subject to the “political safeguards of federalism.”68  These 
actors include the President, the Senate, and the House of 
Representatives.  As Madison explained, the role of the states in their 
selection and composition ensures that “each of the principal branches of 
the federal government will owe its existence to the favor of the State 
governments.”69  In this way, the Constitution is structured to retard 
“new intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.”70 
The Constitution magnifies the effect of the political safeguards by 
denying any single federal actor the power to make federal law 
unilaterally.  Rather, all forms of supreme federal law must be adopted 
by the Senate acting in conjunction with at least one other actor.  For 
example, the Constitution provides that constitutional amendments 
ordinarily receive the approval of two thirds of the House and the Senate 
and three fourths of the states.71  Similarly, the Constitution generally 
requires federal statutes to be approved by the House, the Senate, and the 
President.72  Finally, the Constitution specifies that treaties be submitted 
by the President and approved by two thirds of the Senators present.73  
Although the effectiveness of the political safeguards of federalism has 
waned,74 federal lawmaking procedures continue to constrain federal 
lawmaking by establishing multiple “veto gates,”75 and thus effectively 
creating a supermajority requirement.76  If any of the specified veto 
 
68 The political safeguards of federalism refer to “the role of the states in the 
composition and selection of the central government.”  Herbert Wechsler, The Political 
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the 
National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954) [hereinafter Wechsler, 
Political Safeguards]. 
69 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
70 Wechsler, Political Safeguards, supra note __, at 558. 
71 See U.S. Const. art. V. 
72 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. 
73 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
74 For example, the Seventeenth Amendment has reduced the states’ influence in the 
Senate by replacing appointment of Senators by state legislatures with popular elections.  
See U.S. Const. amend. XVII.  Changes in constitutional law have also limited the states’ 
ability to influence the House of Representatives through control over voter 
qualifications and districting.  See U.S. Const. XV (race); id. amend. XIX (sex); id. 
amend. XXIV (poll tax); id. amend. XXVI (age).  Finally, the states’ modern practice of 
appointing presidential electors on the basis of winner-take-all popular elections has 
reduced the role of state legislatures in selecting the President and all but eliminated the 
possibility that the President will be selected by the House of Representatives voting by 
states. 
75 See McNollgast [Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast], 
Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 705, 707 & n.5 (1992). 
76 See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 74-75 (2001); William T. Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow’s 
Theorem, Article I, and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 
1986 DUKE L.J. 948, 956; Michael B. Rappaport, Amending the Constitution to Establish 
Fiscal Supermajority Rules, 13 J.L. & POL. 705, 712 (1997). 
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players withholds its consent, then no new federal law is created and 
state law remains undisturbed.77 
The constitutional structure suggests, moreover, that the lawmaking 
procedures prescribed by the Constitution are the exclusive means of 
adopting “the supreme Law of the Land.”  The Senate is the only federal 
institution specified by these procedures to participate in all forms of 
federal lawmaking.  The founders specifically designed the Senate to 
represent the states in the new federal government.  By requiring the 
participation and assent of the Senate, the founders effectively gave the 
states (through their representatives in the Senate) the opportunity to veto 
all forms of “the supreme Law of the Land.”  As James Madison 
explained at the Constitutional Convention:  
The State Legislatures . . . ought to have some means 
of defending themselves agst. encroachments of the Natl. 
Govt. In every other department we have studiously 
endeavored to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave 
the States alone unprovided with the means for this 
purpose? And what better means can we provide than the 
giving them some share in, or rather to make them a 
constituent part of, the Natl. Establishment.78 
If the federal government were free to adopt law outside the 
constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures, it could deprive the 
states’ representatives in the Senate of their essential role in the 
lawmaking process.79 
 
77 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional 
Competence, and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1792 
(2005) (“A national government that can act only with difficulty, after all, will tend to 
leave considerable scope for state autonomy.”).  Some commentators and judges have 
even pointed to the existence of the political safeguards of federalism as a reason to 
curtail judicial review of the scope of federal powers.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 647–51 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and 
Ginsburg); id. at 660–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 551 
(1985); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175 (1980); Jesse H. 
Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-à-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial 
Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1557 (1977).  Whatever the merits of this suggestion, see 
Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 91 (2003), there is widespread agreement that the political safeguards built 
into the original constitutional structure were meant to preserve the governance 
prerogatives of the states. 
78 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 7, 1787), in 1 THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 155-56 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS] (statement of George Mason). 
79 The founders understood that the Senate’s essential role in the lawmaking process 
would not only preserve the governance prerogatives of the states, see THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 62, at 378 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting “that the equal vote 
allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty 
remaining in the individual States and an instrument for preserving that residuary 
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The composition and role of the Senate were central issues at the 
Constitutional Convention of 1787.80  Although the Convention agreed 
that state legislatures would appoint Senators,81 it initially deadlocked 
over the proper basis for representation in the Senate.  The large states 
favored proportional representation,82 while the small states sought equal 
representation.83  The debate was protracted, and the issue brought the 
Convention to the brink of collapse.84  The delegates ultimately broke the 
impasse by granting the states equal suffrage in the Senate.85  As Jack 
Rakove has observed, following these developments, “no one could deny 
that the Senate was intended to embody the equal sovereignty of the 
states and to protect their rights of government against national 
encroachment.”86 
The day after approving the states’ equal suffrage in the Senate, the 
Convention adopted the Supremacy Clause.87  The Clause was originally 
suggested by supporters of equal suffrage in the Senate as an alternative 
to the congressional negative,88 and reflects an important, if overlooked, 
bargain inherent in the original constitutional structure.  By conferring 
supremacy only on sources of law that require the Senate’s approval (i.e., 
the “Constitution,” “Laws,” and “Treaties” of the United States), the 
Supremacy Clause restricts federal supremacy to measures approved by 
the states’ representatives in the Senate.  In other words, the states’ 
representatives at the Constitutional Convention agreed to the supremacy 
of federal law (and the corresponding displacement of state law) only on 
the condition that the Senate (structured to represent the states) would 
have power to veto all forms of supreme federal law.89  The founders 
understood that these internal constraints would make it more difficult to 
adopt all forms of supreme federal law, but thought that “[t]he injury 
 
sovereignty”), but also provide an “additional impediment . . . against improper acts of 
legislation.”  Id. 
80 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note __, at 1360-63. 
81 Id. at 1359. 
82 Id. at 1360. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1362-63. 
85 Id. at 1363-64.  In exchange, the Convention required bills for raising revenue to 
originate in the House.  Id.  The proponents of equal suffrage even succeeded in 
exempting this feature of the constitutional structure from amendment by ordinary 
means.  Id. at 1366.  See U.S. Const. art. V (providing that “no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate”). 
86 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 170 (1996). 
87 See Journal of the Constitutional Convention (July 17, 1787), in 2 THE RECORDS OF 
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
88 See Clark, Separation of Powers, supra note __, at 1348-55. 
89 See id. at 1339.  
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which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply 
compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.”90 
The Constitution also places a significant, albeit limited, external 
check on the exercise of federal lawmaking power: judicial review.91  By 
design, federal courts are independent of the political branches and are 
given no role in adopting “the supreme Law of the Land.”92  Key 
founders thought such independence was crucial for the judiciary to 
perform its essential function of policing constitutional bounds against 
the political branches.  As Alexander Hamilton stressed in Federalist 78, 
“[t]he complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly 
essential in a limited Constitution.”93  The courts need both “firmness 
and independence”94 in order to serve “as the bulwarks of a limited 
Constitution against legislative encroachments.”95  The alternative—
unacceptable to the founders—was that “the legislative body are 
themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers and that the 
construction that they put upon them is conclusive upon the other 
departments.”96  Instead, the founders established the judiciary—an 
independent body with no role in the lawmaking process—to serve as an 
 
90 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 444 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
91 Although judicial review is well established, Larry Kramer has recently challenged 
to its historical origins.  See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 
2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2001).  Dean Kramer’s 
scholarship has sparked substantial debate.  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial 
Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 319 (2003); Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty, 
72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2003); Robert F. Nagle, Marbury v. Madison and Modern 
Judicial Review, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 613, 625-32 (2003); Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
John C. Yoo, Questions for the Critics of Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 
(2003); G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1463 (2003). 
92 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  The founders considered, but rejected, the idea of giving 
Supreme Court Justices a formal role in adopting federal statutes.  The Virginia Plan 
originally proposed that a “National Legislature,” composed of two branches, enact laws 
subject to disapproval by “a council of revision” composed of “the Executive and a 
convenient number of the National Judiciary.”  James Madison, Notes on the 
Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787 at 21 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).  The proposal failed in part because 
some delegates objected that the proposal would give judges too much power in 
conjunction with judicial review.  For example, Luther Martin explained that because 
“the Constitutionality of laws . . . will come before the Judges in their proper official 
character,” putting judges on the Council of Revision would give them “a double 
negative.”  James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 21, 1787), in 2 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 73, 76 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
93 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 469. 
96 Id. at 467. 
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outside check against unconstitutional lawmaking.97  Thus, even if the 
House, the Senate, and the President all conclude that a proposed law is 
constitutional, courts must nonetheless disregard the law if they conclude 
that it was not “made in Pursuance” of the Constitution.98 
Both the internal and external constraints on federal lawmaking 
suggest that the Constitution does not authorize courts to exercise the 
kind of policymaking discretion entrusted to the political branches.99  
Such judicial discretion would circumvent the political safeguards of 
federalism because federal courts, by design, are independent of such 
safeguards.  Allowing federal courts to exercise broad policymaking 
discretion would also bypass the requirement that the Senate in 
conjunction with other actors approve all proposals that have the force of 
federal law.  Finally, unbounded judicial discretion would operate to 
nullify the check ordinarily provided by judicial review.  When the 
political branches adopt federal law, the judiciary provides an external 
check against unconstitutional lawmaking.  If federal courts were free to 
impose their will on society, there would be no external check on the 
exercise of such discretion because the courts themselves would judge 
the constitutionality of their own actions.  For the same reasons that the 
founders denied “the legislative body” the opportunity to be “the 
constitutional judges of their own powers,”100 the constitutional structure 
counsels against putting the judiciary in the position of policing the 
exercise of its own policymaking discretion.101 
Given the safeguards established by the Supremacy Clause, it would 
be passing strange to presume that judicial review delegates power to 
judges—without explicit authorization in a specific clause—to displace 
state laws based solely on their own independent judgment of the 
 
97 See id. at 468 (stating that “whenever a particular statute contravenes the 
Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and 
disregard the former”).  
98 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 
(1803) (stating that it is “not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what 
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the 
laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of 
the constitution, have that rank”); Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a 
Constraint on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91 (2003) (explaining how the 
Supremacy Clause supports judicial review). 
99 See Jonathn T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L. J. 
27, 62-63 (2003) (“Error! Main Document Only.Judges are on stronger footing when 
they purport to be interpreting and applying law—and thus exercising bounded 
discretion—than when they seem to be resolving disputes on their own initiative and 
exercising unbounded discretion.”).  
100 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
101 As Chief Justice Marshall explained, “it is apparent, that the framers of the 
constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well 
as of the legislature.”  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 179-80 (1803).  
Reading the Constitution not as a constraint on judges, but as a license for them to 
impose their views on society, arguably “would subvert the very foundation of all written 
constitutions.”  Id. at 178.  Instead of serving as a check against unbridled discretion, the 
judiciary would become the very instrument for its exercise. 
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appropriateness of such laws.  To the contrary, the constitutional 
structure suggests that the Constitution entrusts policymaking discretion 
exclusively to the political branches of the federal government.  The 
Constitution assigns the judiciary the more limited—but essential—role 
of ensuring that the political branches do not violate “the manifest tenor 
of the Constitution” in their exercise of such discretion.102  Interpreting 
the Eighth Amendment—or any other open-ended provision of the 
Constitution—to assign similar discretion to the courts would undermine 
key aspects of the founders’ careful design. 
B. Judicial Discretion and the Founding 
A crucial exchange during the ratification debates suggests that key 
founders understood the constitutional structure to confine judges to the 
exercise of “judgment” rather than “will” in declaring “the sense of the 
law.”103  Antifederalists charged that federal courts under the proposed 
Constitution would be dangerous because they would be unaccountable 
to the people, yet possess wide-ranging discretion to interpret the 
Constitution according to their own preferences.  Federalists countered 
that the exercise of such discretion would be an ultra vires abuse of 
power.  They insisted that federal courts would be the least dangerous 
branch because of their limited role. 
The issue arose when leading Antifederalists—seeking to prevent 
ratification of the Constitution—charged that the judiciary would be the 
most dangerous branch of the proposed federal government.104  In a 
series of essays, Brutus wrote extensively about the dangers of the new 
federal judiciary.  He began by observing that federal judges “are to be 
rendered totally independent, both of the people and the legislature, both 
with respect to their offices and salaries.”105  Such independence was 
especially dangerous when coupled with the “power to resolve all 
questions that may arise on any case on the construction the constitution, 
either in law or equity.”106  This combination, he charged, would enable 
federal judges to exercise unchecked power because “in their decisions 
they will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules, but 
will determine, according to what appears to them, the reason and spirit 
of the constitution.”107  Thus, Brutus “question[ed] whether the world 
 
102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
103 Id. at 469. 
104 As one commentator put it, “we may fairly conclude, we are more in danger of 
sowing the seeds of arbitrary government in this department than in any other.”  See 2 
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 316 (Herbert Storing ed. 1981). 
105 Essay XI of Brutus, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note __, 
at 417,  ___. 
106 Id. at ___.  
107 Id. at ___.  
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ever saw, in any period of it, a court of justice invested with such 
immense powers, and yet placed in a situation so little responsible.”108 
The Antifederalists’ charges did not go unanswered.  Alexander 
Hamilton, writing as Publius, countered that “[t]he complete 
independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited 
Constitution.”109  Without judicial review by an independent judiciary, 
he argued, “all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would 
amount to nothing.”110  The need for an independent judiciary did not 
mean, as Brutus charged, that the Constitution authorized courts to 
exercise unlimited discretion.  Rather, Hamilton understood the judicial 
function to be much more modest.  He explained that to “avoid an 
arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be 
bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to define and 
point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them.”111  
Directly contradicting Brutus, Hamilton insisted that federal courts 
would “have neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment.”112  For 
this reason, “the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always 
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution.”113 
Hamilton recognized the possibility that unscrupulous judges might 
abuse their power, but he thought this argument proved too much: 
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the 
pretense of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure 
to the constitutional intentions of the legislature.  This 
might as well happen in the case of two contradictory 
statutes; or it might as well happen in every adjudication 
upon any single statute.  The courts must declare the sense 
of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL 
instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would be equally 
the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative 
body.  The observation, if it proved anything, would prove 
that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.114 
Hamilton believed that the country could avoid the danger of willful 
judges by appointing individuals with the requisite skill and integrity.   
 In this regard, Hamilton saw life tenure and salary protection as part 
of the solution rather than part of the problem.  He thought there would 
be relatively “few men in the society who will have sufficient skills in 
 
108 Essay XV of Brutus, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 
__, at ___.  
109 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 471. 
112 Id. at 465. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 468-69. 
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the laws to qualify them for the stations of judges.”115  Moreover, 
“making the proper deductions for the ordinary depravity of human 
nature, the number must be still smaller of those who unite the requisite 
integrity with the requisite knowledge.”116  Hamilton argued that a 
“temporary duration in office” would discourage good candidates “from 
quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept a seat on the bench.”117  
This, in turn, would tend “to throw the administration of justice into 
hands less able and less well qualified to conduct it with utility and 
dignity.”118  Life tenure, by contrast, would attract upstanding individuals 
less likely to abuse their office by exercising will instead of judgment. 
Although the founders disagreed over the magnitude of the danger 
posed by judicial independence, the exchange between Brutus and 
Publius reveals that they were united in their understanding that it would 
be an abuse of power for federal judges to “substitute their own pleasure 
to the constitutional intentions of the legislature.”119  Thus, both the 
constitutional structure and the founders’ understanding of Article III 
suggest that the Constitution “did not grant judges the right to exercise 
their own unlimited discretion or will instead of judgment.”120  To the 
contrary, those who ratified the Constitution expected judges to act with 
integrity and restraint as “the mere instruments of the law.”121  Although 
the founders’ expectations themselves are not necessarily authoritative, 
they correspond quite closely with the understanding of judicial power 
that later became firmly entrenched within our constitutional traditions. 
III. Historical Practice and Judicial Discretion 
The permissible scope of judicial discretion under the constitutional 
structure is an issue that has periodically divided the polity.  In two 
prominent instances raising the issue, the Supreme Court—and, indeed, 
the legal community more broadly—has concluded that courts should not 
be presumed to possess such discretion.  The founders understood that 
the Constitution, like all laws, contained ambiguities that could only be 
 
115 Id. at 471. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 471-72. 
119 Id. at 468-69. 
120 Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 53 (1995).  
121 Chief Justice Marshall, who participated in the Virginia ratifying convention, 
reflected the founders’ sentiments in Osborne v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824): 
Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing. When they 
are said to exercise a discretion, it is a mere legal discretion, a discretion to 
be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law; and, when that is 
discerned, it is the duty of the Court to follow it.  Judicial power is never 
exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge; always for 
the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Legislature; or, in other words, 
to the will of the law. 
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settled over time.122  As James Madison explained:  “All new laws, 
though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest 
and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of 
particular discussions and adjudications.”123  In two of the most 
prominent historical “discussions and adjudications,” the Court adopted 
an understanding of our constitutional scheme that is squarely at odds 
with the notion of delegated judicial discretion to displace state law—
discretion of the sort that the Court now claims under the Eighth 
Amendment.  In each case, the judiciary initially embraced judicial 
discretion only to later reject it emphatically as inconsistent with the 
constitutional structure. 
A. Federal Common Law Crimes 
Following ratification, the first Congress established lower federal 
courts and specified their jurisdiction in the Judiciary Act of 1789.124  
The following year, Congress adopted the Crimes Act of 1790,125 which 
established a handful of federal crimes and their respective penalties.126  
The Crimes Act, however, left large gaps in the federal penal code.  
Early federal judges, including most of the Supreme Court Justices 
sitting on circuit, tried to fill the void by following the English practice 
of recognizing and enforcing non-statutory common law crimes.  These 
judges gave little, if any, consideration as to how the practice fit within 
the constitutional structure. 
Federal judges originally adopted federal common-law crimes in an 
attempt to enforce President Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation of 
1793.127  Attempting to keep the United States out of the war between 
Britain and France, Washington proclaimed that the federal government 
would punish Americans who committed, aided, or abetted hostilities 
 
122 See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise 
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE L. J. 1663, 1729 (2004) (explaining that “open questions 
about ‘the judicial power’ came to be settled by practical exposition of the proper role of 
the courts in our constitutional system”). 
123 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
124 1 Stat. 73 (1789).  The discussion in the text draws in  part on Clark, Separation of 
Powers, supra note __, at 1404-12. 
125 1 Stat. 112 (1790). 
126 These crimes included treason, misprision of treason, murder and manslaughter 
within federal enclaves, misprision of felonies on the high seas or within federal 
enclaves, piracy, accessory to piracy before and after the fact, counterfeiting the public 
securities of the United States, stealing or falsifying federal judicial records, perjury and 
subornation of perjury in federal court, bribery of federal judges, obstruction of federal 
judicial process, rescuing federal prisoners convicted of capital crimes, prosecuting 
certain writs or processes against foreign ambassadors and other public ministers, and 
offering violence to the person of a foreign ambassador or other public minister.  See id. 
at 112-18. 
127 Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON 430 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., United States Government Printing Press 
1931).  
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against any of the warring powers.  Although there was no federal statute 
prohibiting such conduct, Washington gave “instructions to those 
officers to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted against 
all persons, who shall . . . violate the law of nations, with respects to the 
powers at war.”128  Notwithstanding Washington’s proclamation, the 
French recruited Americans to serve on privateers sailing out of 
American ports to attack British ships.  Gideon Henfield agreed to serve 
as the captain of one such privateer, and was arrested for violating the 
Neutrality Proclamation after he captured a British ship and brought it to 
Philadelphia. 
Justice Wilson, sitting on the Circuit Court, charged the federal 
grand jury in Henfield’s Case.129  Wilson instructed the grand jury that 
“the common law” had been “received in America,”130 that “the law of 
nations” “in its full extent is adopted by her,” and that “infractions of that 
law form a part of her code of criminal jurisprudence.”131  Accordingly, 
Wilson instructed that “a citizen, who in our state of neutrality, and 
without the authority of the nation, takes an hostile part with either of the 
belligerent powers, violates thereby his duty, and the laws of his 
country.”132  The grand jury returned an indictment against Henfield. 
At trial, Henfield’s counsel challenged the court’s power to enforce 
non-statutory crimes,133 but Justice Wilson (on behalf of himself, Justice 
Iredell, and Judge Peters) unequivocally rejected this contention in his 
charge to the petit jury: 
It is the joint and unanimous opinion of the court, that the 
United States, being in a state of neutrality relative to the 
present war, the acts of hostility committed by Gideon 
Henfield are an offence against this country, and punishable 
by its laws. It has been asked by his counsel, in their 
address to you, against what law has he offended? The 
answer is, against many and binding laws. As a citizen of 
the United States, he was bound to act no part which could 
injure the nation; he was bound to keep the peace in regard 
to all nations with whom we are at peace. This is the law of 
nations; not an ex post facto law, but a law that was in 
existence long before Gideon Henfield existed.134 
 
128 Id. at 430-31. 
129 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). 
130 Id. at 1106. 
131 Id. at 1107.  
132 Id. at 1108. 
133 Id. at 1119 (arguing that “as there was no statute giving jurisdiction, the court 
could take no cognizance of the offense”). 
134 Id. at 1120.  For an insightful analysis of Justice Wilson’s approach to federal 
common law crimes as well as his broader judicial philosophy, see Arthur E. Wilmarth, 
Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and the Problem of Reconciling 
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The jury acquitted Henfield without explanation.  President Washington 
quickly urged Congress “to extend the legal code and the jurisdiction of 
the Courts of the United States to many cases which, though dependent 
on principles already recognised, demand some further provisions.”135  In 
response, Congress enacted the Neutrality Act, establishing new statutory 
crimes expressly prohibiting conduct like Henfield’s.136 
Despite Henfield’s acquittal, federal courts continued to enforce 
federal common law crimes throughout the 1790’s.137  In fact, it was not 
until 1798, in United States v. Worrall,138 that a federal judge seriously 
questioned the legitimacy of federal common-law crimes.  The case 
involved an attempt to bribe a federal Commissioner of Revenue.  After 
the jury found Worrall guilty, his counsel, Alexander Dallas, “moved in 
arrest of judgment, alleging that the Circuit Court could not take 
cognizance of the crime charged in the indictment.”139  Dallas argued that 
the offense cannot “be said to arise under the Constitution, or laws of the 
United States” because there was no law prohibiting Worrall’s 
conduct.140  Dallas also strenuously challenged the proposition “that 
though the offence is not specified in the Constitution, nor defined in any 
act of Congress; yet, that it is an offence at common law; and that the 
common law is the law of the United States, in cases that arise under 
their authority.”141  Dallas argued that “[t]he nature of our Federal 
compact, will not . . . tolerate this doctrine” because “the very powers 
that are granted [to the federal government] cannot take effect until they 
are exercised through the medium of a law.”142 
 
Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal Republic, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113 (2003). 
135 4 Annals of Cong 10-11 (Dec 3, 1793). 
136 Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat 381.  For an extended discussion of Henfield’s Case and 
its aftermath, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress, 
1793-1795, 63 U.CHI. L. REV. 1, 4-16 (1996). 
137 See United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714, 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a) 
(upholding the indictment and conviction of the Consul from Genoa for sending 
anonymous and threatening letters with the intent to extort money, notwithstanding the 
defendant’s argument that “the matter charged in the indictment was not a crime by the 
common law, nor is it made such by any positive law of the United States”); United 
States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147, 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792) (No. 16,323) (permitting a 
prosecution for passing counterfeit bank bills of the Bank of the United States 
notwithstanding defense counsel’s objection that “there was no federal statute on the 
subject; hence only an offense of common law”).  
138 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798).  
139 Id. at 389.  
140 Id. at 390.  
141 Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted).  
142 Id.; see also id. (“Congress has undoubtedly a power to make a law, which should 
render it criminal to offer a bribe to the Commissioner of the Revenue; but not having 
made the law, the crime is not recognized by the Federal Code, constitutional or 
legislative; and, consequently, it is not a subject on which the Judicial authority of the 
Union can operate.”). 
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William Rawle, the United States attorney, countered that “it is 
unreasonable to insist, that merely because a law has not prescribed an 
express and appropriate punishment for the offence, that, therefore, the 
offence, when committed, shall not be punished by the Circuit Court, 
upon the principles of common law punishment.”143  Justice Chase 
interrupted Rawle and inquired: “Do you mean, Mr. Attorney, to support 
this indictment solely at common law?  If you do, I have no difficulty 
upon the subject: The indictment cannot be maintained in this Court.”144 
Justice Chase explained that the Constitution both confers limited 
powers on the federal government and restricts the manner in which the 
government may exercise them.145  In the case before the court, Chase 
acknowledged that the power to punish bribery of federal officials “is 
certainly included in” Congress’s necessary and proper power.146  Thus, 
according to Chase, the question “does not arise about the power; but 
about the exercise of the power:— Whether the Courts of the United 
States can punish a man for an act, before it is declared by a law of the 
United States to be criminal?”147  Chase concluded that it is “essential, 
that Congress should define the offences to be tried, and apportion the 
punishments to be inflicted, as that they should erect Courts to try the 
criminal, or to pronounce a sentence on conviction.”148 
 
143 Id. at 392. 
144 Id. at 393. 
145 See id. at 393-94 (stating that “the Constitution of the Union is the source of all the 
jurisdiction of the national government; so that the departments of the government can 
never assume any power, that is not expressly granted by that instrument, nor exercise a 
power in any other manner than is there prescribed”). 
146 Id. at 394. 
147 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
148 Id.  Judge Peters disagreed, concluding that the United States possesses the 
common law “power to punish misdemeanors,” and that such power may be exercised 
either “by Congress, in the form of a Legislative act,” or by federal courts “in a course of 
Judicial proceeding.”  Id. at 395.  In light of this division of opinion, “the Judges and the 
Attorney of the District [expressed a wish] that the case might be put into such a form, as 
would admit of obtaining the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court, upon the important 
principle of the discussion.”  Id. at 396.  Worrall’s counsel declined, and the court 
imposed a mitigated sentence.  Commentators debate why Justice Chase agreed to 
impose a sentence notwithstanding his objections to federal common law crimes.  See 
Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the 
Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 N.W. L. REV. 27, 69 (1978) (suggesting 
that Chase’s view on the question was “malleable, if not a complete turnaround”); 
Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority, Federalism and the Common 
Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 L. & HIST. REV. 223, 235 (1986) (suggesting that 
“Chase did not change his mind on the common law question,” and crediting Judge 
Peters’ account that he “practiced a pious maneuver & [Chase] joined in pronouncing a 
very just, but mild sentence” without realizing “‘till too late, that he had pronounced 
judgment with a divided Court’”) (quoting Letter from Richard Peters to Timothy 
Pickering (March 30, 1816)); WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 147 (1995) 
(stating that Chase “continued for the rest of his career to reject the federal courts’ 
authority to try criminal prosecutions based upon the common law”). 
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Ironically, it was the enactment of a federal criminal statute that set 
in motion a debate that ultimately forged a consensus against the 
constitutionality of federal common law crimes.  In 1798, Federalists 
adopted the infamous Sedition Act, which made it a crime to “write, 
print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious” words 
about Congress or the President.149  Prior to the Act, Federalists had used 
common law seditious libel prosecutions to punish detractors.  Justice 
Chase’s opinion in Worrall the same year motivated Federalists in 
Congress to enact legislation.150  Jefferson and his party saw the Sedition 
Act as an attempt to silence political opposition and challenged its 
constitutionality.151  The Virginia legislature quickly passed a resolution 
declaring the Sedition Act to be “unconstitutional” as an exercise of “a 
power not delegated by the constitution, but on the contrary, expressly 
and positively forbidden by one of the amendments thereto.”152 
Federalists like Oliver Ellsworth countered “that the Act presented 
no ‘constitutional difficulty’ because the federal courts were already 
authorized to punish seditious libel as a common-law crime.”153  
Federalists pointed out that the effect of the Act was actually “to mitigate 
the undue rigor of the common law, and to give opportunity for the 
person charged to clear himself by proving the truth of his assertion.”154  
On this account, the Sedition Act did not abridge—but actually 
enlarged—the freedom of speech. 
Republicans refocused their attack by denying the central premise 
of the Federalists’ defense: “‘that the common or unwritten law’ . . . 
makes a part of the law of these States, in their united and national 
capacity.”155  In January 1800, the Virginia Legislature issued a report, 
 
149 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
150 See CASTO, supra note , at 148 (noting that “[t]his legislation was motivated in part 
by Chase’s unsettling opinion,” which “cast some doubt on the legitimacy of federal 
common-law prosecutions”). 
151 Although the Sedition Act would undoubtedly raise First Amendment concerns 
today, the Amendment did not obviously apply in 1798 because it “was regarded as 
guaranteeing nothing more than the common law definition of freedom of the press: the 
freedom to publish without prior restraint.”  Rowe, supra note __, at 936 (citing 
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 220-349 (1985)). 
152 Virginia Resolution (Dec. 24, 1798).  Kentucky passed a similar resolution.  See 
Kentucky Resolution (Dec. 3, 1799) (declaring the alien and sedition laws to be 
“palpable violations of the said constitution”). 
153 CASTO, supra note , at 149 (quoting Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Timothy 
Pickering (Dec. 12, 1798)); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110, 5th Cong., 3d Sess., in 20 
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, at 181, 183 and 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 2989 (1799) (stating that 
“the act in question cannot be unconstitutional, because it makes nothing penal that was 
not penal before, and gives no new powers to the court, but is merely declaratory of the 
common law”). 
154 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 415 (1800) (statement of Rep. Robert Harper); see also 
Rowe, supra note , at 937 (“In sharp contrast to the common law, the Sedition Act 
permitted the accused to offer truth as an affirmative defense.”). 
155 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 18, 1800), in 6 WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON 347, 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter WRITINGS OF MADISON]. 
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written by James Madison, raising two objections to federal 
incorporation of the common law.  First, Madison argued that such 
incorporation would be inconsistent with the limited and enumerated 
powers assigned to the federal government.156  The Report stressed that 
the Federal Government is “composed of powers specifically granted, 
with a reservation of all others to the states or to the people,” and then 
asked: “In what part of the Constitution . . . is this authority to be 
found?”157  After reviewing various provisions, Madison specifically 
rejected any suggestion that “the common law is . . . adopted or 
recognized by the Constitution.”158  Were it otherwise, he explained, “the 
authority of Congress [would be] co-extensive with the objects of 
common law.”159  “The authority of Congress would therefore be no 
longer under the limitations, marked out in the Constitution. They would 
be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever.”160 
Second, and more important for present purposes, Madison argued 
that federal incorporation of the common law “would confer on the 
judicial department a discretion little short of a legislative power.”161  
Because such incorporation would “present an immense field for judicial 
discretion,” it would require the federal judiciary “to decide what parts of 
the common-law would, and what would not, be properly applicable to 
the circumstances of the United States.”162  According to Madison, 
giving federal judges this degree of discretion “over the law would, in 
fact, erect them into legislators.”163 
The Sedition Act expired in 1801, and the debate over federal 
common law crimes temporarily subsided with the inauguration of 
Thomas Jefferson.164  Jefferson pardoned individuals convicted during 
the Adams Administration under the Sedition Act, and stressed his view 
that the Act was unconstitutional.165  Jefferson’s administration thereafter 
 
156 “The nature of the [common] law of England makes it impossible that it should 
have been adopted in the lump into such a Government as this is; because it was a 
complete system for the management of all the affairs of a country.”  9 ANNALS OF CONG. 
3012 (1799) (statement of Mr. Nicholas).  As Madison explained, because Congress’s 
power is coextensive with federal judicial power, recognition of a federal common law 
would mean that “Congress would therefore be no longer under the limitations marked 
out in the constitution.  They would be authorized to legislate in all cases whatsoever.”  6 
WRITINGS OF MADISON 347, 380.  
157 James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 7, 1800), reprinted in 6 
WRITINGS OF MADISON 347, ___. 
158 Id. at __. 
159 Id. at __. 
160 Id. at __. 
161 Id. at 380. 
162 Id. at 381. 
163 Id. 
164 After taking office, Jefferson “discontinued the prosecution against [Federalist 
editor] William Duane under the now expired Sedition Act.”  Preyer, supra note , at 238. 
165 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 8 THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (Ford ed. 1897). 
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avoided the question of federal common law crimes by pursuing 
“prosecutions of Federalist editors for seditious libel . . . in the state 
courts in 1803, 1804 and 1806.”166  In 1806, however, Republicans 
sought to prosecute two Federalist editors, Hudson and Goodwin, for 
common law seditious libel in federal court, giving rise to the case in 
which the Supreme Court would ultimately repudiate federal common 
law crimes.167  The case did not reach the Supreme Court until 1812.  By 
then, Republican appointees constituted a majority of the Court for the 
first time and Republican conceptions of the constitutional structure had 
gained increasing popular acceptance.  Although both the Attorney 
General and the defendants’ counsel declined to argue the case, the Court 
proceeded to the merits. 
Justice Johnson delivered the opinion of the Court and disavowed 
judicial discretion to recognize and enforce federal common-law crimes.  
Johnson stated the question broadly as “whether the Circuit Courts of the 
United States can exercise a common law jurisdiction in criminal 
cases.”168  Johnson’s opinion was brief, reflecting his view that the 
question had long been “settled in public opinion,”169 and the “course of 
reasoning” in support of the Court’s conclusion “is simple, obvious, and 
admits of but little illustration.”170  Johnson noted that the Supreme Court 
alone “possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from the 
constitution.”171  Lower federal courts, by contrast, “possess no 
jurisdiction but what is given them by the power that creates them, and 
can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the general 
Government will authorize them to confer.”172  The Court, however, 
found it unnecessary “to inquire whether the general Government, in any 
and what extent, possesses the power of conferring on its Courts a 
 
166 Id. at 239.  The Republicans’ willingness to pursue common law prosecutions in 
state court underscores the fact that their objections to federal common law crimes were 
based on the constitutional structure rather than on a broad view of the freedom of 
speech. 
167 Kathryn Preyer recounts that the controversy began when Connecticut Federalists 
initiated a prosecution for seditious libel “in the state court (under statutory authority) 
against the editor of the Jeffersonian Litchfield Witness.”  Id. at 242.  “Jefferson’s newly 
appointed District Judge in Connecticut, Pierpont Edwards, retaliated by inviting the 
federal grand jury to return common law indictments for libels against the President,” 
reminding them that “‘[w]hatever may be my own opinion upon the question, [whether 
there] are there any common law offenses recognizable by the courts of the United 
States[,] I deem it my duty to declare to you the law, as pronounced by those judges.’”  
Id. at 242-43 (quoting The Witness (Litchfield, Conn.), April 30, 1806). 
168 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). 
169 Id. at 32 (“Although this question is brought up now for the first time to be decided 
by this Court, we consider it as having been long since settled in public opinion.”); see 
also id. (“In no other case for many years has this jurisdiction been asserted; and the 
general acquiescence of legal men shews the prevalence of opinion in favor of the 
negative of the proposition.”). 
170 Id. at 33. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. 
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jurisdiction in cases similar to the present; it is enough that such 
jurisdiction has not been conferred by any legislative act.”173 
Recalling arguments made in earlier cases,174 Justice Johnson stated 
that “[t]he only ground on which it has ever been contended that this 
jurisdiction could be maintained is, that, upon the formation of any 
political body, an implied power to preserve its own existence and 
promote the end and object of its creation, necessarily results to it.”175  
The Court again found it unnecessary to examine “how far this 
consideration is applicable to the peculiar character of our 
constitution.”176  Rather, the Court explained that even if this 
consideration were “applicable to the state of things in this country, the 
consequence [of such implied powers] would not [be the] result . . . 
which is here contended for.”177  “The legislative authority of the Union 
must first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the 
Court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence.”178  
Although Hudson & Goodwin rejected federal common law crimes, 
the question was not finally settled until four years later in United States 
v. Coolidge.179  Coolidge began in the Circuit Court in Massachusetts 
when several defendants were indicted for forcibly rescuing a prize.  
Justice Story, sitting on circuit, posed the question as “whether the circuit 
court of the United States has jurisdiction to punish offences against the 
United States, which have not been previously defined, and a specific 
punishment affixed, by some statute of the United States.”180  Justice 
Story “considered the point, as one open to be discussed, 
notwithstanding the decision in U.S. v. Hudson,” because that decision 
was “made without argument, and by a majority only of the court.”181  
Justice Story sought to allay fears of unbridled judicial discretion by 
narrowing the range of common law crimes cognizable in federal court.  
 
173 Id. 
174 See United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 395 (1793) (Peters, J.) 
(“Whenever a government has been established, I have always supposed, that a power to 
preserve itself, was a necessary, and inseparable, concomitant.”). 
175 Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33. 
176 Id. at 34. 
177 Id.  
178 Id.  The Court acknowledged that “[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result 
to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution,” such as the power to “fine for 
contempt–imprison for contumacy–[and] inforce the observance of order.”  Id.  The 
Court insisted, however, that “all exercise of criminal jurisdiction in common law cases 
. . . is not within their implied powers.”  Id. 
179 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816). 
180 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857). 
181 Id. at 621.  Justice Story began by noting that § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
gave the circuit courts “‘exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable 
under the authority of the United States.’”  Id. at 619 (quoting 1 Stat. 78 (1748)).  Story 
denied that this jurisdiction is limited to “crimes and offences specially created and 
defined by statute,” id. at 619, because the jurisdiction “could not . . . have been given in 
more broad and comprehensive terms.”  Id. at 620. 
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Thus, he purported to ascertain “what are [the] crimes and offences 
against the United States” by reference to “the principles of the common 
law, taken in connexion with the constitution.”182  “Without pretending 
to enumerate them in detail, I will venture to assert generally, that all 
offences against the sovereignty, the public rights, the public justice, the 
public peace, the public trade and the public police of the United States, 
are crimes and offences against the United States.”183  Justice Story 
concluded that the offense charged—forcibly rescuing a prize—met this 
test and declared the proper punishment to be the common law “penalty 
of fine and imprisonment.”184 
Before Coolidge reached the Supreme Court, Justice Johnson also 
had occasion to revisit the question of federal common law crimes on the 
Circuit Court.  William Butler was indicted for piracy in South Carolina 
federal court for both common law and statutory crimes.  Although the 
case is unreported, Johnson apparently arranged to have his opinion 
printed as a “Pamphlet to the Public.”185  Johnson’s opinion held that the 
Crimes Act of 1790 did not reach the defendant’s conduct,186 and then 
proceeded to examine “whether the Courts of the United States possess 
common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.”187  Justice Johnson began by 
noting that “advocates for this kind of jurisdiction . . . do not contend for 
the adoption of the entire system of the Common Law.”188  But this very 
concession, intended to alleviate one type of constitutional objection, 
only served to underscore another.  Recalling Madison’s objections, 
Johnson explained, “if the courts of the United States are to be at liberty 
to select such parts [of the common law] as in their judgment are 
applicable,” then they must “erect themselves as legislators in the 
selection.”189  Johnson thought the exercise of this degree of judicial 
 
182 Id. at 620. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 621.  In the alternative, Story attempted to distinguish Hudson & Goodwin on 
the ground that “however broad in its language,” the decision did not involve “offences 
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.”  Id.  According to Story, “[t]he admiralty is a 
court of extensive criminal, as well as civil jurisdiction.”  Id.  Although Justice Story 
acknowledged that the Judiciary Act gives federal courts express jurisdiction “in civil 
cases of admiralty jurisdiction, but not in criminal cases,” he nonetheless contended that 
“criminal cases are necessarily included in the grant of cognizance of all ‘crimes and 
offences cognizable under the authority of the United States.’” Id. 
185 Trial of William Butler for Piracy 3 (C.C.D. S.C. 1813) (copy on file with the 
George Washington University Law Library).  
186 Id. at 6-10. 
187 Id. at 10. 
188 Id. at 21.  Apparently responding to Justice Story’s approach in Coolidge, Justice 
Johnson mocked the suggestion that federal common law crimes meaningfully could be 
narrowed to “offences, against the sovereignty, the public rights, the public justice, the 
public peace, public trade, public police, &c. &c.”  Id. at 19. 
189 Id. at 21.  Another passage confirms that Justice Johnson’s objection to federal 
common law crimes was based more on judicial evasion of constitutionally-prescribed 
lawmaking procedures than on a lack of federal power: 
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discretion would be unconstitutional, and concluded “with much regret 
that we thus decide in favor of so flagrant an offender.”190 
When Coolidge finally reached the Supreme Court in 1816, the 
result was anticlimactic.  The Attorney General stated that he had 
“examined the opinion of the court . . . in the case of the United States v. 
Hudson and Goodwin,” that he “consider[ed] the point as decided in that 
case.”191  Justice Story responded, “I do not take the question to be 
settled by that case.” 192  Justice Johnson declared, “I consider it to be 
settled, by the authority of that case.”193  Justice Washington indicated 
his willingness to consider the question “[w]henever counsel can be 
found ready to argue it.”194  Finally, Justice Livingston stated that he was 
“disposed to hear argument on the point,” but that “until the question is 
re-argued, the case of the United States v. Hudson and Goodwin must be 
taken as law.”195  Justice Johnson then delivered the opinion of the Court, 
stating simply that in the absence of argument “the court would not 
choose to review their former decision in the case of the United States v. 
Hudson and Goodwin, or draw it into doubt.”196 
Although now largely overlooked,197 the Supreme Court’s 
repudiation of federal common law crimes played a significant role in 
curbing judicial discretion under the constitutional structure.  Because 
the Court resolved the question early in the nation’s history, one might 
erroneously assume that the practice never had any real support.  In fact, 
“the Hudson Court disapproved at least eight circuit court cases, [and] 
brushed off the views of all but one Justice who sat on the Court prior to 
 
Can anyone doubt the power of Congress under [the Necessary and 
Proper] clause, to pass laws, fully commensurate or even surpassing the 
Common Law provisions, for the punishment of offences against the 
sovereignty, rights, justice, peace, trade, or police of the United States?  
And why have they not done it in any particular case?  Unquestionably, 
because they did not think it necessary.  Why then should it be competent 
to the Courts of the United States, to assert that it is necessary, and 
proceed to punish offences against which Congress has not thought 
proper to legislate?  Surely we should wait until summoned to the aid of 
the general government, or we may be deemed officious, forward and 
intrusive. 
Id. at 27. 
190 Id. at 35.  
191 United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415 (1816). 
192 Id. at 416. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197 See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE  AGE OF STATUTES 245 n.39 (1982) 
(noting that “the United States has never had a federal common law of crime”). 
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1804.”198  Similarly, because the issue seems fairly narrow today, it is 
easy to overlook the fact that the debate over federal common law crimes 
went quite explicitly to the very nature of judicial power under the 
constitutional structure both as it relates to the legislative powers of 
Congress and as it relates to the powers reserved by the Constitution to 
the states.  The decision to abandon non-statutory federal crimes reflects 
the Court’s recognition that the constitutional structure limits not only 
the scope of federal power, but also the means by which the government 
may exercise such power.  More specifically, the rejection of federal 
common law crimes provides significant confirmation of the view, 
embraced by prominent founders, that federal courts should exercise 
judgment rather than will under the constitutional structure. 
B. The Swift Doctrine 
A second—and, to contemporary lawyers, more familiar—
controversy further illustrates the settled understanding that the 
attribution of open-ended judicial discretion to disregard state law 
contradicts the interrelated features of the constitutional structure that 
govern federal lawmaking and safeguard federalism.  The controversy 
arose in the Nineteenth Century from the Supreme Court’s increasing 
application of so-called “general common law” in diversity cases.  
Justice Story was again a central figure.  In Swift v. Tyson,199 Justice 
Story held on behalf of the Court that federal courts may disregard state 
court decisions and exercise independent judgment on questions of 
general law.200  Although the Swift doctrine originated with a question of 
commercial law, it gradually expanded to encompass a wide array of 
matters traditionally governed by local law.  Nearly a century later, 
following sustained criticism, the Court declared the Swift doctrine to be 
unconstitutional in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.201  In so doing, the Court 
invoked principles of judicial federalism derived from federal lawmaking 
procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and the Supremacy 
Clause. 
 
198 Gary D. Rowe, Note, The Sound of Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 
the Jeffersonian Ascendancy, and the Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 
YALE L.J. 919, 920 (1992). 
199 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
200 My colleague, Art Wilmarth, has pointed out that James Wilson—a strong 
proponent of federal common law crimes—arguably anticipated Swift by advocating a 
separate branch of equity jurisdiction to develop and apply a uniform mercantile law in 
American courts.  See Wilmarth, supra note __, at 163-64. 
201 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (explaining that the Court would not ordinarily 
“abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century,” but that “the 
unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do 
so”). 
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1. The Origins of the Swift Doctrine 
Although Swift was arguably defensible when decided,202 it quickly 
expanded into “an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts 
of the United States.”203  Swift began as a suit between citizens of 
different states that raised an unsettled question of commercial law—
whether acceptance of a negotiable instrument in satisfaction of a 
preexisting debt involved consideration sufficient to confer upon the 
recipient the status of “a bona fide holder.”204  Although several prior 
New York decisions suggested that such consideration was inadequate,205 
the Supreme Court exercised independent judgment to conclude that 
release of a preexisting debt was sufficient consideration.206  The Court 
considered the question to be one of “general commercial law,”207 upon 
which the Court was free “to express our own opinion.”208  
At the time Swift was decided, states did not clearly consider 
questions of general commercial law to be governed by local law.  
Historically, such questions were governed by the law merchant, a 
branch of the law of nations.  This did not mean, however, that courts 
were free to exercise unbridled discretion.  Rather, as Blackstone 
explained, the law merchant was “a particular system of customs . . . 
which, however different from . . . the common law, is . . . allowed, for 
 
202 The following analysis of Swift is drawn in part from my earlier writings on the 
case.  For further discussion, see Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural 
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1277-92 (1996). 
203 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (internal quotations omitted). 
204 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 16. 
205 In Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), the New York Supreme Court 
for the Correction of Errors recognized “[t]he general rule ... that where negotiable paper 
is transferred for valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraud, the right of the 
holder shall prevail against the true owner.”  Id. at 644-45 (Woodworth, J.).  The court, 
however, concluded that the defendants in Coddington were not entitled to the benefit of 
the rule because they had not given “valuable consideration” for the notes. Strictly 
speaking, the question whether the release of a preexisting debt constitutes valuable 
consideration was not presented in Coddington because the defendants admitted that at 
the time they received the notes, the persons from whom they received them “were not, 
in a strict legal sense, indebted to [the defendants] in any amount whatever.”  Id. at 644 
(Woodworth, J.).  Nonetheless, several of the opinions suggested that an antecedent debt 
is not a valuable consideration under the rule.  See id. at 648 (Woodworth, J.); id. at 651 
(Spencer, C.J.); id. at 655 (Viele, Sen.).  Although the Supreme Court for the Correction 
of Errors had not “pronounced any positive opinion upon” the question when Swift was 
decided, see Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18, several lower court decisions had ruled in 
accordance with Coddington's dicta.  See, e.g., Payne v. Cutler, 13 Wend. 605 (1835); 
Rosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 85 (1833); Wardell v. Howell, 9 Wend. 170 (1832).  The 
Court in Swift noted that “the more recent [New York] cases ... have greatly shaken, if 
they have not entirely overthrown [the earlier] decisions,” 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 17, but the 
Court was willing to assume arguendo that “the doctrine [was] fully settled in New 
York” that “a pre-existing debt was not a sufficient consideration to shut out the equities 
of the original parties in favor of the holders,” id. at 17-18.  
206 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19-21. 
207 Id. at 18. 
208 Id. at 19. 
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the benefit of trade,” and “which all nations agree in and take notice 
of.”209  Such law was traditionally based on the commercial customs and 
practices of merchants and was applied by all “civilized” nations to 
resolve disputes among merchants from different countries.210  Nations 
and states followed the law merchant in order to facilitate international 
and interstate trade by establishing uniform rules to govern transactions 
among diverse citizens.211  
In the early nineteenth century, both federal and state courts 
“considered themselves to be deciding questions under a general law 
merchant that was neither distinctively state nor federal.”212  For this 
reason, the courts of each sovereign understood themselves free to 
exercise independent judgment to ascertain applicable customs and, 
when necessary, reach conclusions contrary to the decisions of the other.  
For example, in Swift, the Supreme Court looked to “the principles 
established in the general commercial law,” rather than to the decisions 
of New York state courts, in deciding a dispute between citizens of 
 
209 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *75, *264. 
210 See 1 id. at *75 (“[A] particular system of customs ... called the custom of 
merchants, or lex mercatoria ... is ... allowed, for the benefit of trade, to be of the utmost 
validity in all commercial transactions ....”). 
211 See 1 id. at *264 (“[A]s these are transactions carried on between the subjects of 
independent states, the municipal laws of one will not be regarded by the other.  For 
which reason the affairs of commerce are regulated by ... the law merchant or lex 
mercatoria, which all nations agree in and take notice of.”); Zephaniah Swift, A Digest of 
the Law of Evidence, in Civil and Criminal Cases.  And a Treatise on Bills of Exchange, 
and Promissory Notes at ix (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke 1810) (“In questions of 
commercial law, the decisions of Courts, in all civilized, and commercial nations, are to 
be regarded, for the purpose of establishing uniform principles in the commercial 
world.”).  See generally Francis M. Burdick, What Is the Law Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. 
REV. 470 (1902).  William Fletcher points out that “[t]he concept of a uniform law 
merchant was quite naturally imported into the treatment of commercial law by 
American courts,” William A. Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1518 
(1984), because the general common law was regarded at the time as a “great universal 
law,” “regularly and constantly adhered to.”  4 Blackstone, supra note __, at *67. 
212 Fletcher, supra note__, at 1554.  Swift made this point explicitly:  “It is observable, 
that the courts of New York do not found their decisions [regarding the adequacy of 
consideration], upon any local statute, or positive, fixed or ancient local usage; but they 
deduce the doctrine from the general principles of commercial law.”  Swift, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) at 18.  On questions of this kind, “the state tribunals are called upon to perform the 
like functions as ourselves, that is, to ascertain, upon general reasoning and legal 
analogies, . . . what is the just rule furnished by the principles of commercial law to 
govern the case.”  Id. at 19.  At the time, New York courts took the same approach.  For 
example, in Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 637 (N.Y. 1822), the New York Court for the 
Correction of Errors recognized “[t]he general rule ... that where negotiable paper is 
transferred for a valuable consideration, and without notice of any fraud, the right of the 
holder shall prevail against the true owner.”  Id. at 644-45 (Woodworth, J.).  The court 
considered the rule to be “well established,” id. at 647 (Woodworth, J.), and consistent 
with “the usual course of trade.”  Id. at 651 (Spencer, C.J.).  That the court recognized 
this rule as part of the general law merchant is suggested by Chief Judge Spencer’s 
observation that the rule “is not only right in itself, but the contrary doctrine would 
destroy the circulation of notes, and would justly alarm the mercantile world.”  Id. 
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different states arising under the law merchant.213  The Court noted that 
such decisions “are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate 
attention and respect of this court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, 
or conclusive authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up 
and governed.”214   
Likewise, New York courts considered themselves equally free to 
disregard the Supreme Court’s decisions on questions of general 
commercial law.215  Just two years after Swift, counsel urged New York’s 
highest court to conform its decision “to the opinion of Mr. Justice Story 
in the recent case of Swift v. Tyson.”216  Although recognizing that on 
“question[s] of commercial law, ... it is desirable that there should be, as 
far as practicable, uniformity of decision, not only between the courts of 
the several states and of the United States, but also between our courts 
and those of England,” the court declined to follow the rule embraced in 
Swift and described the Supreme Court as a “tribunal, whose decisions 
are not of paramount authority” on such questions.217 
Taken in historical context, the Swift Court arguably did what New 
York law instructed—exercise independent judgment to ascertain the 
applicable rule of customary commercial law.  For this reason, “Swift 
appears to have been regarded when it was decided”—not as an 
unconstitutional assumption of power by federal courts—but “as little 
more than a decision on the law of negotiable instruments.” 218  As long 
as New York courts purported to decide interstate commercial disputes 
according to a general body of customary commercial law rather than 
“local usage,” the Supreme Court’s approach in Swift was arguably 
consistent with the constitutional structure. 
2. The Expansion of the Swift Doctrine 
Although Swift may have been defensible when decided, two 
subsequent developments undermined its legitimacy.  First, state courts 
gradually abandoned reliance on the general law merchant in favor of 
 
213 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18. 
214 Id. at 19. 
215 See Fletcher, supra note__, at 1561 (“State courts generally followed common law 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court, but they were quite explicit in stating that 
they did not do so because of any legal compulsion.”). 
216 Stalker v. M’Donald, 6 Hill 93, 95 (N.Y. 1843). 
217 Id. at 112.  Similarly, in deciding a question of general commercial law in 1822, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared that “[t]he decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the United States have no obligatory authority over this court, except in cases growing 
out of the constitution, of which this is not one.”  Waln v. Thompson, 9 Serg. & Rawle 
115, 122 (Pa. 1822) (emphasis added).  Although asserting the right to exercise 
independent judgment, the court recognized the “importance of preserving the uniformity 
of commercial law throughout the United States.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Accordingly, 
Justice Tilghman stated, “I shall always be inclined to adopt [the] opinions [of the 
Supreme Court], rather than those of any foreign court, unless when I am well satisfied, it 
is in the wrong.”  Id. 
218 Fletcher, supra note __, at 1514. 
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local commercial doctrines.  Thus, even in cases like Swift, federal courts 
could no longer disregard state court decisions without exercising 
independent judgment as to the content of the law to be applied.  Second, 
federal courts expanded the Swift doctrine to encompass an ever-growing 
list of legal questions historically governed by state law.  The expanded 
Swift doctrine allowed federal courts to exercise an ever-increasing 
degree of policymaking discretion to decide questions traditionally 
governed by local law.  These two developments ultimately led Erie to 
declare the Swift doctrine unconstitutional. 
Following Swift, states increasingly regarded commercial law as an 
aspect of local law rather than part of the general law merchant.  Both 
state courts and state legislatures participated in this shift.  State courts 
gradually abandoned the ideal of a universal law merchant and began to 
formulate commercial doctrines as a matter of state law.219  At the same 
time, state legislatures enacted specific statutes to govern commercial 
transactions in such states.220  As a result, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, commercial law varied widely from state to state.221  The 
resulting conflicts of laws undermined interstate trade and gave rise to 
successful efforts to have states enact uniform commercial laws.222  Such 
laws, of course, were designed to perform the function previously served 
by the now defunct law merchant—i.e., to encourage interstate trade 
through uniform commercial law.223  Notwithstanding the states’ 
abandonment of the law merchant, federal judges continued to apply 
Swift and disregard state court decisions in favor of their own 
conceptions of general commercial law. 
Equally significant, federal courts expanded the Swift doctrine well 
beyond its commercial origins to encompass numerous questions 
traditionally governed by local law.  One of the most significant steps in 
this expansion was the Court’s decision to disregard state tort law in 
favor of so-called “general law.”  In 1862, in a case concerning liability 
for negligence, the Court declared that “where private rights are to be 
determined by the application of common law rules alone, this Court, 
although entertaining for State tribunals the highest respect, does not feel 
bound by their decisions.”224  This trend continued and by the time Erie 
 
219 See Lyman D. Brewster, The Promotion of Uniform Legislation, 6 YALE L. J. 132, 
140 (1897) (arguing for “statutory unity rather than [judicial] diversity, in matters of 
common interest”).  
220 See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH & JOHN HONNOLD, COMMERCIAL LAW 5 (4th ed. 1985) 
(noting that “[b]y 1890 every state had at least one statute on negotiable instruments”). 
221 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 355 (1973) (stating that 
“each state from Maine to the Pacific was a petty sovereignty, with its own brand of 
law”).   
222 See id. at 355, 471 (“By 1900, [the uniform Negotiable Instruments Law] had been 
widely enacted ....”).   
223 See Brewster, supra, at 134 (“[G]reat care is taken to preserve the use of words 
which have had repeated legal constructions and become recognized terms in the Law 
Merchant.”). 
224 Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 418, 428-29 (1862). 
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was decided, federal courts claimed the right to exercise independent 
judgment with respect to dozens of historically local questions including 
negligence, punitive damages, and property rights.225  Unlike commercial 
disputes, such matters had never been considered by states to be 
governed by general law. 
These two developments—the continued application of the Swift 
doctrine to commercial questions and its expansion to numerous local 
matters—severely undermined the legitimacy of the Swift doctrine.  
Justice Field was one of the first members of the Court to challenge the 
constitutionality of the doctrine.  In Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. 
Baugh,226 Justice Field denounced the Court’s decision to disregard the 
Ohio common law of fellow servant liability in favor of so-called 
“general law.”  Although acknowledging that he had applied Swift in the 
past, Justice Field believed that “there stands, as a perpetual protest 
against its repetition, the constitution of the United States, which 
recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the 
states.”227  Justice Holmes embraced the same position, characterizing the 
Swift doctrine as “an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the 
Courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of 
opinion should make us hesitate to correct.”228  
3. The Unconstitutionality of the Swift Doctrine 
By 1938, the Swift doctrine had become untenable.  Although 
neither party asked it to do so, the Supreme Court overruled Swift in Erie 
R. Co. v. Tompkins. 229  According to the Court, “in applying the [Swift] 
doctrine this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights which in our 
opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several states.”230  
Commentators have long debated the precise nature of the constitutional 
defect found in Erie.231  Careful review suggests that the Court became 
convinced that the Swift doctrine had become little more than an excuse 
for federal courts to exercise will instead of judgment in contravention of 
federal lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and 
 
225 See TONY FREYER, HARMONY & DISSONANCE: THE SWIFT & ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 71 (1981) (observing that “the federal judiciary continued to enlarge the 
body of general law so that by 1890 it included some 26 doctrines”); Erie, 304 U.S. at 
75-76 (detailing the expansion of the Swift doctrine). 
226 149 U.S. 368 (1893). 
227 Id. 
228 Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer 
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
229 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
230 Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. 
231 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.3 (2d ed. 1994)  (stating that 
“[t]he constitutional basis for the Erie decision has confounded scholars”); Jack 
Goldsmith & Steven Walt, Erie and the Irrelevance of Legal Positivism, 84 VA. L. REV. 
673, 676 (1998) (noting that Erie’s “holding has been subject to disagreement and 
controversy over the years”). 
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the Supremacy Clause.  As discussed below, these considerations suggest 
that Erie rests on mutually reinforcing principles of separation of powers 
and federalism. 
Several alternative constitutional rationales merit only brief 
discussion.  For example, some commentators have suggested that Erie’s 
constitutional analysis should be considered dictum, and that the decision 
is best understood to rest solely on the Court's interpretation of § 34 of 
the Judiciary Act of 1789,232 also known as the Rules of Decision Act.233  
Although it is true that the Court examined § 34 and overruled “the 
construction given to it by the [Swift] Court,”234 the Court expressly 
declined to rest its decision on statutory grounds.  According to the 
Court: “If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we 
should not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied 
throughout nearly a century.  But the unconstitutionality of the course 
pursued has now been made clear, and compels us to do so.”235  Thus, 
according to the Court itself, the constitutional rationale was necessary to 
support the judgment. 
Other commentators have suggested that the equal protection 
“component” of the Fifth Amendment supplies a plausible basis for the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Erie, relying on the Court’s statement that 
“the [Swift] doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the law.”236  
First, the structure of the Court’s opinion appears to foreclose this 
reading.  Erie’s reference to “equal protection” appears in a preliminary 
section of the opinion describing the “political and social” defects of the 
Swift doctrine rather than the section specifically explaining “the 
unconstitutionality of the course pursued.”237  Second, at the time Erie 
was decided, the Court had not yet interpreted the Fifth Amendment’s 
due process clause to (reverse) incorporate an equal protection 
component applicable to the federal government.238  The unavailability 
 
232 See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994) (codifying the current version of the Rules of 
Decision Act). 
233 See Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding 
Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L. J. 267, 278 (1946). 
234 Erie, 304 U.S. at 72. 
235 Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note __, § 5.3 (stating that 
“Justice Brandeis made it clear that the constitutional argument was integral to the 
Court’s holding” in Erie). 
236 Erie, 304 U.S. at 75; see, e.g., John R. Leathers, Erie and its Progeny as Choice of 
Law Cases, 11 HOUS. L. REV. 791, 795-96 (1974) (discussing the Fifth Amendment’s 
equal protection component as a possible basis for the Court’s decision in Erie). 
237 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74, 77-78. 
238 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note __, § 5.3 (stating that Erie’s reference to equal 
protection “appears to be a rhetorical rather than a constitutional argument because the 
Supreme Court had not yet applied the requirements of equal protection to the federal 
government”).  On  the development of equal protection jurisprudence, contrast LaBelle 
Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) (rejecting an equality-based 
challenge on the ground that “[t]he Fifth Amendment has no equal protection clause”) 
with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (subjecting federal racial 
classification to equal protection scrutiny for the first time).  See also Bradford R. Clark, 
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of an equal protection claim in 1938 confirms that Erie used the phrase 
solely in a broader, non-constitutional sense. 
Finally, some might read Erie as resting on traditional notions of 
limited federal power under the Tenth Amendment.239  The Court’s 
opinion does, after all, contain various references to “the autonomy and 
independence of the states,”240 the rights “reserved by the Constitution to 
the several states,”241 the limited matters “specifically authorized or 
delegated to the United States,”242 and Congress’s lack of “power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.”243  This 
reading of the opinion, however, is too simplistic.  In light of the Court's 
contemporaneous decisions broadly construing the Commerce Clause,244 
it seems unlikely that Erie meant to suggest that Congress lacked power 
to enact rules to govern the question before the Court—i.e., the duty of 
care owed by an interstate railroad to pedestrians walking along the right 
of way.  In any event, any suggestion to this effect was mere dictum 
because Congress had not in fact enacted an applicable federal statute.245 
Looking beyond these explanations of the Erie opinion, one can 
identify a deeper constitutional flaw with the Swift doctrine.  Over time, 
the doctrine evolved into little more than an excuse for federal courts to 
exercise broad policymaking discretion on behalf of society unchecked 
by the Constitution’s carefully crafted lawmaking procedures.  Such 
discretion raised separation of powers concerns because it allowed the 
 
Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Section Five Action: The Fallacy of Reverse 
Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1969, 1970-72 (1984) (discussing the origin and 
development of reverse incorporation). 
239 See Goldsmith & Walt, supra note ___, at 677; Benno Schmidt, Substantive Law 
Applied by the Federal Courts—Effect of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 16 TEX. L. REV. 512, 
520-24 (1938). 
240 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (internal quotations omitted). 
241 Id. at 80. 
242 Id. at 79. 
243 Id. at 78. 
244 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress’s power under 
the Commerce Clause extends to certain intrastate activities that, in aggregate, affect 
interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) 
(holding that Congress has the power to exercise control over intrastate activities that 
have a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce); Clark, Federal Common 
Law, supra note __, at 1258 (noting the Court’s broad grant of federal authority in its 
Commerce Clause cases and its contemporaneous denial of similar authority in Erie); 
Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682, 
1684 n.10 (1974) (suggesting that Congress could have used its power under the 
Commerce Clause to enact a rule of decision act contrary to the result in Erie). 
245 Chief Justice Stone, who joined the Erie opinion, apparently held this view:  “‘[I] 
do not think it is at all clear that Congress could not apply (enact) substantive rules to be 
applied by federal courts. I think that Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins did not settle that 
question, notwithstanding some unfortunate dicta in the opinion.’”  ALPHEUS THOMAS 
MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 480 (1956) (quoting Letter from Harlan 
Stone to Owen J. Roberts (Jan. 3, 1941)); see also id. at 480-81 (quoting Letter from 
Harlan Stone to Felix Frankfurter (Apr. 29, 1938)) (“Beyond [the federal courts’ 
unconstitutional assumption of powers] it was unnecessary to go.”). 
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life-tenured judiciary to encroach upon the authority of Congress and the 
President.  At the same time, such discretion raised federalism concerns 
because it permitted federal courts to displace state law outside the 
Supremacy Clause and the political safeguards of federalism built in to 
the constitutional structure to protect the governance prerogatives of the 
states.246  By circumventing these safeguards, the Swift doctrine 
ultimately became “an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the 
Courts of the United States.”247 
Erie’s reasoning suggests that its animating principle was that 
agents of the federal government have the power to displace background 
principles of state law only when one of the lawmaking methods 
incorporated by the Supremacy Clause is followed.  In this way, the 
Court relied on the structural safeguards built into those procedures—
including the founders’ decision to give the Senate the right to participate 
in adopting (and therefore to veto) all forms of “the supreme Law of the 
Land”—as a way to guard against promiscuous and insufficiently 
considered displacement of state law.  Thus, Erie confirmed that federal 
courts lack inherent discretion under the constitutional structure to act 
independently to adopt law capable of displacing state law. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in explaining how courts 
applying the Swift doctrine “have invaded rights . . . reserved by the 
Constitution to the several states,”248 the Erie Court began by 
paraphrasing the Supremacy Clause:  “Except in matters governed by the 
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any 
case is the law of the state.”249  The Court’s statement presupposes that 
the Supremacy Clause provides the exclusive basis in the Constitution 
for displacing state law.250  Under the Clause, the federal government 
may displace state law only by successfully adopting an applicable 
provision of “[t]his Constitution,” “the Laws of the United States . . . 
made in Pursuance thereof,” or “Treaties made . . . under the Authority 
of the United States.”251  The Constitution, in turn, prescribes three 
distinct sets of “finely wrought and exhaustively considered”252 
procedures to govern the adoption of each source of law recognized by 
 
246 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
247 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (internal quotations omitted). 
248 Id. at 80. 
249 Id. at 78.  Of course, the Supremacy Clause refers not only to the “Constitution” 
and “Laws,” but also to “Treaties.”  See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
250 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, (2000) (“As the Supreme Court 
and virtually all commentators have acknowledged, the Supremacy Clause is the reason 
that valid federal statutes trump state law.”). 
251 U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. 
252 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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the Supremacy Clause.253  These procedures assign federal lawmaking 
exclusively to the political branches of the federal government and the 
states.  By design, federal courts were given no role in the process.  Erie 
acknowledged this omission by emphasizing that “no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer . . . power upon the federal courts”254 “to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state.”255 
The Swift doctrine undermined these features of the constitutional 
structure by allowing federal courts to displace state law unconstrained 
by federal lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, 
and the Supremacy Clause.  In other words, the Swift doctrine was 
“unconstitutional” because it permitted judges to displace traditional 
principles of state law in favor of their own independent notions of sound 
public policy.  As Justice Field argued, the “general law” applied by 
federal courts under the Swift doctrine was “little less than what the judge 
advancing the doctrine [thought] at the time should be the general law on 
a particular subject.”256  Allowing federal courts to exercise this degree 
of policymaking discretion was inconsistent with key aspects of the 
constitutional structure and interfered with “‘the autonomy and 
independence of the States.’”257  Thus, Erie stressed that “[t]he common 
law so far as it is enforced in a State . . . is not the common law generally 
but the law” as declared by the courts of that state.258  As Henry 
Monaghan put it, “federal judicial power to displace state law is not 
coextensive with the scope of dormant congressional power.  Rather, the 
federal courts must point to some source, such as a statute, treaty, or 
constitutional provision, as authority for the creation of substantive 
federal law.”259  In the absence of such authority, the exercise of judicial 
discretion to override state law constitutes “‘an unconstitutional 
assumption of powers.’”260 
 
253 See U.S. Const. art. V (authorizing two thirds of the House and Senate and three 
fourths of the states to adopt “Amendments to this Constitution”); U.S. Const. art. I, §7, 
c. 2 (requiring bicameral passage by the House and Senate and presentment to the 
President before a bill “becomes a Law”); U.S. Const. art. II, §2, c. 2 (authorizing the 
President and two thirds of the Senate “to make Treaties”). 
254 304 U.S. at 78. 
255 Id. 
256 Baugh, 141 U.S. at 401 (Field, J., dissenting).  
257 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (quoting Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting)).   
258 Erie, 304 U.S. at __. 
259 Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional 
Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1975). 
260 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & 
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 534 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).   Of 
course, there are other historical instances in which the Court first embraced broad 
judicial discretion to set aside state law and then abandoned such discretion as 
illegitimate.  Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New 
York law regulating the hours of bakers as inconsistent with the liberty of contract 
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), and Atkins v. 
Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a District of Columbia law 
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IV. Reassessing Eighth Amendment Discretion 
The Supreme Court’s recent embrace of broad judicial discretion 
under the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth 
Amendment raises many of the same concerns under the constitutional 
structure that previously led the Court to abandon both federal common 
law crimes and the Swift doctrine.  The Court now claims the right to set 
aside traditional state law punishments in the name of the Eighth 
Amendment based on the Justices’ own “independent judgment” as to 
what constitutes “‘the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.’”261  The Court has made no attempt to 
ground this assertion of policymaking discretion in the text or history of 
the Constitution, and apparently failed to consider the structural 
considerations that led earlier Courts to abandon similar doctrines of 
judicial discretion.  
It is possible, of course, to imagine that the founders of a 
constitution might wish to confer broad policymaking discretion on 
judges insulated from the political process.  The question, however, is 
whether inferring such a delegation is appropriate in contexts in which 
the Constitution does not plainly grant it.  As discussed, the 
constitutional structure, key aspects of the ratification debates, and 
several notable historical precedents all counsel against interpreting 
ambiguous provisions of our Constitution to confer open-ended 
policymaking discretion upon federal courts.  Such discretion would 
allow the judiciary to exercise will instead of judgment and would 
undercut the political safeguards of federalism built into the Supremacy 
Clause and federal lawmaking procedures.  In view of these structural 
considerations—reinforced over time by the settled understanding 
reflected in the historical instances discussed above—proponents of 
broad judicial discretion under the Eighth Amendment bear the burden of 
establishing that the provisions in question unambiguously delegate such 
authority to federal courts. 
Article III is again illustrative.  Proponents of both federal common 
law crimes and general common law under Swift simply assumed that 
Article III delegated authority to federal courts to embrace these 
doctrines.  For example, in defending federal common law crimes, 
Justice Story explained: “[T]he clause, that ‘the judicial power shall 
extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution,’ &c. 
is inexplicable, without reference to the common law; and the extent of 
this power must be measured by the powers of courts of law and equity, 
and exercised and established by that system.”262  Justice Story did not 
 
establishing minimum wages for women), with West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
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under the due process clause). 
261 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1190 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) 
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262 United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857). 
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believe that federal courts would have discretion to recognize any and all 
common law offences.  Rather, he assured skeptics that judges would be 
constrained by “the principles of the common law, taken in connexion 
with the constitution.”263  This meant that federal courts could recognize 
only “public offences” that “when directed against the United States . . . 
must upon principle be deemed offences against the United States.”264  
Under this standard, Justice Story concluded that, “independent of any 
statute,” “treasons, and conspiracies to commit treason, embezzlement of 
the public records, bribery and resistance of the judicial process, riots 
and misdemeanors on the high seas, frauds and obstructions of the public 
laws of trade, and robbery and embezzlement of the mail of the United 
States, would be offences against the United States.”265 
Likewise, in defending the Swift doctrine, serious scholars have 
argued that by granting federal courts diversity jurisdiction, Article III 
authorized federal courts to disregard “aberrational state laws” and 
“creat[e] special substantive rules applicable in multistate cases.”266  In 
essence, they maintain that “Article III’s purpose to provide a neutral 
forum protecting nonresidents from discrimination justified Swift and its 
progeny.”267  At the same time, during the Swift era, the Supreme Court 
maintained that its decisions were not based on the subjective 
preferences of the Justices, but rather on Article III’s incorporation of an 
objective body of “general law.”268 
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Supreme Court ultimately 
abandoned both federal common law crimes and the Swift doctrine as 
inconsistent with the proper role of federal courts in the federal system.  
Although the open-ended language of Article III—“the judicial 
Power”—can be read to encompass these doctrines, the Court found this 
reading inadmissible because it would have conferred more discretion on 
federal courts than the constitutional structure suggests they should 
exercise.269  For example, notwithstanding Justice Story’s assurances, the 
 
263 Id. at 620.  
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265 Id.  In such cases, Justice Story was convinced that “the common law can be 
referred to, and made the rule of decision in criminal trials in the courts of the United 
States.”  Id. at 621.  
266 Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, The Rise of Legal 
Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEXAS L. REV. 79, 81 
(1993); see Henry Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in 
State and Federal Courts, 4 ILL. L. REV. 533, 537-38 (1910). 
267 Goldsmith & Walt, supra note __, at 683. 
268 See Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 372-73 (1893); Burgess v. 
Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883); Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517, 520-21 
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269 One potential counterexample is federal common law—rules of decision that 
purport to have the force of federal law, but whose content cannot be traced by 
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States.  See Clark, Federal Common Law, supra  note __, at 1247.  Even here, however, 
the Supreme Court has rejected open-ended judicial lawmaking and attempted to limit 
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Court ultimately agreed with Madison’s objection that giving federal 
judges discretion to pick and choose federal common law crimes “would, 
in fact, erect them into legislators.”270  Similarly, Erie rejected as fallacy 
“the assumption that there is ‘a transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by 
statute.’”271  Once this fallacy was revealed, Erie saw the Swift doctrine 
as little more than an excuse for judicial lawmaking, and declared that its 
application “invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the 
Constitution to the several states.”272  The Court’s resolution of these 
significant historical controversies suggests that unless the Constitution 
unambiguously confers open-ended judicial discretion to displace state 
law, the constitutional structure precludes it. 
The Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment precedent takes a 
very different approach.  Like proponents of federal common law crimes 
and the Swift doctrine, the Court embraced broad judicial discretion in 
the name of a provision of the Constitution (in this case, the cruel and 
unusual punishments clause) without any specific textual or historical 
showing that the provision was meant to delegate such discretion.273  
 
obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes . . . , and admiralty 
cases.”  Texas Indus. v. Radcliff materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).  Many so-called 
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Clark, Federal Common Law, supra  note __, at 1251; cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 35 (1985) (suggesting that 
some federal common lawmaking—“delegated” and “preemptive” lawmaking—is 
legitimate because authorized by Congress).  Even admiralty—the most entrenched 
enclave of federal common law dating back to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 
205 (1917)—has recently been called into question.  See American Dredging Co. v. 
Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 459 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that “Jensen and its progeny represent an unwarranted assertion of 
judicial authority to strike down or confine state legislation . . . without any firm 
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__, at 1360 (suggesting that “the judiciary’s imposition of ‘general maritime law’ under 
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Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273, 279 (1999) (stating 
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Unlike earlier doctrines of judicial discretion, however, the Court’s 
recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence makes no pretense about the 
nature of the discretion it assigns to judges.  Rather, the Justices now 
openly claim for themselves the right to depart from the “objective 
indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of 
legislatures that have addressed the question,”274 in favor of their own 
independent judgment concerning the morality, efficacy, and propriety of 
a given punishment in today’s society.275 
Even assuming that the Court’s assessment of these complex policy 
matters is correct, its assertion that the Eighth Amendment gives federal 
judges open-ended discretion to make such moral judgments on behalf of 
society is at least questionable in light of the constitutional structure.  
Echoing Swift-era dissents, today’s dissenting Justices charged that the 
Court has substituted “its own ‘inevitably subjective judgment’ on how 
best to resolve this difficult moral question for the judgments of the 
Nation’s democratically elected legislatures.”276  Given that the 
constitutional structure takes great pains to assign policymaking 
discretion to politically accountable officials using “finely wrought and 
exhaustively considered” procedures,277 the Court should refrain from 
imposing its will on society unless the Constitution unambiguously 
instructs it to do so. 
One might argue that the Supreme Court’s earlier precedents 
rejecting federal common law crimes and the Swift doctrine represent 
little more than an interpretation of Article III as such.  This reading, 
however, ignores the broader structural underpinnings of those decisions.  
Although Article III provided the immediate impetus of these issues, 
both the Court and the public saw the doctrines as raising fundamental 
questions about the nature of judicial discretion under the constitutional 
structure.  In denouncing federal common law crimes, for example, 
Madison warned that the doctrine “would confer on the judicial 
department a discretion little short of a legislative power.”278  Similarly, 
in rejecting the doctrine, Justice Johnson objected that if federal courts 
are free to adopt federal common law crimes, they must “erect 
themselves as legislators in the selection.”279  And, in denouncing the 
Swift doctrine, Justice Field observed that the applicable rules of decision 
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were “little less than what the judge advancing the doctrine [thought] at 
the time should be the general law on a particular subject.”280  In light of 
the Supremacy Clause and the associated procedural safeguards of 
federalism, Erie rejected such discretion as “an unconstitutional 
assumption of powers by the Courts of the United States.”281  Given 
systemic nature of the structural safeguards underlying these decisions, it 
is difficult to conclude that judicial discretion asserted under other 
provisions is logically distinguishable from analogous discretion 
previously claimed under Article III.  Accordingly, the Court should not 
infer broad judicial discretion absent an express constitutional 
delegation.282 
In this regard, it is significant that the Supreme Court’s novel 
approach to the Eighth Amendment makes no attempt to justify the 
exercise of policymaking discretion by reference to either the text or 
history of the cruel and unusual punishments clause.283  My purpose here 
is not to question that basic approach, but rather to identify the 
appropriate set of background assumptions that the Court should bring to 
bear from the overall constitutional structure when it is not relying on the 
specific historical understanding of the clause.  In other words, I take the 
Court’s basic framework of evolving standards of decency as my starting 
point and then ask which conception of that framework better comports 
with the constitutional structure as a whole.  That effort, I should add, is 
not contradicted by the Amendment itself.  It provides that “cruel and 
unusual punishments” shall not be inflicted.284  Although this is not the 
occasion to consider the original understanding of that phrase, it is safe 
to say at least that the clause is drafted in sufficiently open-ended terms 
to allow the Supreme Court leeway in its interpretation.285  The existence 
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of a range of permissible interpretations, however, does not mean that the 
text will bear any construction.  Thus, before invalidating a particular 
penalty, the Court must explain why it constitutes “cruel and unusual” 
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. 
In ascertaining whether a particular punishment is “cruel,” the 
Supreme Court looks to the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.  In order to harmonize this approach with 
the constitutional structure, the Court should employ an objective test 
and give due deference to legislative judgments.  The Court’s approach 
to the related question of proportionality is instructive.  Although some 
Justices dispute the existence of a proportionality requirement under the 
cruel and unusual punishments clause,286 others apply “a ‘narrow 
proportionality principle’” in non-capital cases.287  For example, in 
recently upholding California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law, 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Kennedy, signaled their willingness to invalidate a sentence only if it “‘is 
grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime.’”288  This narrow 
approach was grounded in part on Justice Kennedy’s earlier concurrence 
insisting “that proportionality review be guided by objective factors.’”289  
Justice Kennedy stressed that “‘[o]ur federal system recognizes the 
independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through 
criminal law.’”290  On this assumption, the best indicators of whether a 
particular punishment satisfies evolving standards of decency are the 
laws adopted by the people’s elected representatives.  In Roper, Justice 
Kennedy arguably abandoned this approach by disregarding the 
judgment of twenty state legislatures concerning the propriety of the 
juvenile death penalty. 
Of course, even if a punishment is “cruel,” it must also be “unusual” 
to trigger scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.  The Supreme Court 
often analyzes this issue by asking whether there is a “national 
consensus” against the punishment in question.  Because we have a 
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federal system with fifty states, there will almost always be some degree 
of disagreement among the states regarding the proper uses of particular 
punishments.  That some states abandon a punishment does not 
necessarily render it “unusual” within the meaning of the Amendment.  
At some point, however, a punishment may become so rare that it 
satisfies this requirement.  The crucial question, therefore, is how many 
states must abolish a punishment in order for a court to find it “unusual” 
under the clause? 
Certainly, there is room for debate, but here again the constitutional 
structure may suggest a tentative answer.  Because Article V requires the 
approval of three fourths of the states to amend the Constitution, 
construing ambiguous constitutional provisions to authorize courts to 
invalidate punishments based on the views of fewer than three quarters 
of the states would arguably contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of 
Article V.  As Henry Monaghan has explained, “Article V was designed 
to permit a very small number of states (currently thirteen) containing 
but a fraction of the total national population to block constitutional 
change.”291  From this perspective, it would be odd to interpret the 
Eighth Amendment to invalidate a traditional punishment when at least 
thirteen states continue to authorize the practice.292 
In this regard, the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence arguably pays inadequate attention to both the 
constitutional text and the constitutional structure.  As discussed, twenty 
states continued to authorize the juvenile death penalty when the Court 
invalidated the punishment as “cruel and unusual.”  In light of Article V 
and the implications of the constitutional structure, the Court should have 
required a greater degree of consensus among the states.  Indeed, the 
Court’s approach seems to read the term “unusual” out of the Eighth 
Amendment altogether by claiming authority to invalidate punishments it 
finds penologically or morally deficient, regardless of how many states 
permit the practice.293  This degree of judicial discretion not only 
contradicts the text, but also allows federal courts to exercise will instead 
of judgment contrary to the implications of constitutionally-prescribed 
lawmaking procedures, the political safeguards of federalism, and the 
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Supremacy Clause. 
For similar reasons, the constitutional structure suggests that the 
Court’s reliance on international law to displace state law was also 
questionable.294  In support of its decision to invalidate the juvenile death 
penalty, the Court invoked several unratified international agreements, 
including Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, which prohibits the execution of juvenile offenders.295  The 
Constitution requires the concurrence of the President and two thirds of 
the Senate to adopt a treaty.  Presidents of both parties and the Senate 
have consistently refused to adopt the Convention as a treaty partly 
because they wished to preserve the states’ traditional control over the 
death penalty.296  In addition, as Curtis Bradley had pointed out, “the 
United States has indicated that, if and when it does ratify these treaties, 
it will attach a reservation declining to agree to the ban on juvenile 
executions.”297  This is a textbook example of the political safeguards of 
federalism at work.  The Court circumvented these safeguards to the 
extent that it relied on unratified—and apparently unratifiable—
provisions of international agreements to invalidate the juvenile death 
penalty.  At least when the President and the requisite proportion of the 
Senate have refused to adopt an international prohibition, the Court 
should respect the results of the political process and disregard such 
prohibitions.298 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Supreme Court claims extraordinary authority under the Eighth 
Amendment to exercise “independent judgment” to decide the propriety 
of a particular punishment on behalf of society.  Judicial discretion on 
this scale necessarily raises concerns related to separation of powers and 
democratic legitimacy.  But such discretion also implicates various 
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features of the constitutional structure—federal lawmaking procedures, 
the political safeguards of federalism, and the Supremacy Clause—
designed to preserve the governance prerogatives of the states.  Without 
a stronger showing that the Eighth Amendment confers this degree of 
judicial discretion, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Court’s 
current approach—like federal common law crimes and the Swift 
doctrine—permits courts to exercise will rather than judgment and thus 
represents “an unconstitutional assumption of powers by the Courts of 
the United States.”299 
 
299 Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (internal quotations omitted). 
